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Abstract
Administrative agencies rely heavily on the foundational legal mechanisms of the
administrative state – rulemaking, licensing, and enforcement adjudication – to pursue their
statutory objectives. These foundational mechanisms differ from each other in critical ways,
including the applicable procedures (and the participatory rights that accompany them), the legal
effect of their use, and the nature and extent of oversight (including judicial oversight) that
accompany their use. As a result, an agency’s choice of which mechanism(s) to use to
implement its statutory mission has significant impacts on key legitimizing features and values
of the administrative state.
Despite its importance, agency mechanism choice occurs largely in the shadows of the
administrative state. Congress typically gives agencies considerable autonomy to choose among
legal mechanisms, and none of the three branches whose actions legitimize agency action pays
much attention to how agencies make those choices. Scholars’ traditional conception of
“canonical administrative law” similarly has generally given short shrift to agency mechanism
choice. This neglect is a prominent example of the symptomatic lack of attention to what some
have referred to as internal administrative law.
This Article helps to fill this gap in the literature through an empirical case study of how
one agency, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has used regulations, permitting,
and enforcement adjudication to reform its enforcement program through implementation of an
initiative called “Next Generation Compliance” (Next Gen). The case study demonstrates that at
least five variables have influenced EPA’s agency mechanism choices to advance Next Gen – the
key actors that participate in programmatic design and implementation (both within and outside
the agency), the agency’s goals, the governance tools at its disposal, its authority under different
statutory regimes, and what we refer to as “intra-mechanism” features (differences, for example,
between administrative and judicial enforcement adjudication). Ours is the first empirical study
in the law review literature of which we are aware that seeks to unpack an agency’s mechanism
choices to advance understanding of the choices an agency made, why it made them, and what
effects those choices had. Because we examine factors that have not been considered before in
the literature, the Article holds special promise for significantly extending and enriching our
understanding of critical factors that influence agency mechanism choice decisions. The
provisional assessment of the implications of our findings that we provide should help guide
policymakers interested in driving agency mechanism choices toward strategies most likely to
accomplish statutory goals while promoting the legitimacy of administrative decisionmaking.
I.

Introduction

This Article explores questions at the heart of the operation of the federal administrative
state that relate to agencies’ choice of legal mechanisms to carry out their statutory missions.
Three types of legal mechanisms – rulemaking, licensing, and enforcement adjudication – are the
basic legal instruments that administrative agencies use to do their work and pursue their
statutory objectives.1 The factors that govern agency mechanism choice, and the implications of
1

The administrative law casebooks and treatises highlight the central role these mechanisms play in agency work.
See, e.g., ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT
2
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such choices for agencies’ ability to promote the goals of the statutes they administer, are worthy
of close attention for at least two reasons. First, agencies would be able to accomplish little
without recourse to one or more of the three basic mechanisms and the administrative state
would largely grind to a halt without their use. It is therefore important to understand the manner
in which these mechanisms operate and how and why agencies choose among them.
Second, these fundamental building blocks for the operation of the administrative state
differ from each other in critical ways, including in the procedures agencies must follow in using
them (and the participatory rights that accompany them), the legal effect of their use, and the
nature and extent of oversight (including judicial oversight) that accompany their exercise.2
Because of these significant differences,3 an agency’s choice among available legal mechanisms
to advance a policy goal has significant implications for fundamental administrative law values
such as transparency, accountability, participation, deliberation, fairness, and consistency, and
therefore for the legitimacy of the administrative state.4 Thus, it is incumbent on anyone
interested in understanding how the administrative state operates, and in assessing its legitimacy,
to give close attention to an agency’s use of its available legal mechanisms to carry out its
mission.5

chs. 3-5, 7 (2d ed. 2015); WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 13 (3d ed. 2009); JOHN
F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 546 (2nd ed. 2015); see also Robert L.
Glicksman & David L. Markell, Unraveling the Administrative State: Mechanism Choice, Key Actors, and
Regulatory Tools, 36 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 318 (2018) [hereinafter Unraveling]. Agencies also rely on other mechanisms
to advance their agendas, including nonbinding actions such as guidance documents. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal
Agency Guidance: An Institutional Perspective 4, 7 (Admin. Conf. of the United States, Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/parrillo-agency-guidance-final-report.pdf (stating that
“[g]uidance . . . is a ubiquitous and essential feature of countless agency programs,” and noting that guidance is
“conventionally said to be nonbinding”). The debate about the binding character of guidance is longstanding and we
do not address it here. The Trump Administration has mandated that agencies reduce their reliance on informal
mechanisms such as guidance documents. See, e.g., Memorandum for All Components from the Attorney General,
Prohibition on Improper Guidance Documents (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1012271/download.
2
M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Forum, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1384 (2004) (pointing out
that “[t]he agency’s choice among these policymaking forms matters because . . . each is distinct” in terms of the
three factors cited in the text). The third variable, judicial oversight, may be further unpacked into two sub-parts –
whether and when agency action is judicially reviewable and the standard of review a court will use when review is
available. Id. at 1396.
3
Differences between legal mechanisms can be overstated. See Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10 th
Cir. 1973) (considering whether an agency should have used adjudication rather than rulemaking in a particular
situation); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 924 (1965) [hereinafter Shapiro, Choice] (noting that it is not always easy to
distinguish between rulemaking and adjudication).
4
Magill, supra note 2, at 1396 (noting that “the agency makes an important choice when it selects the policymaking
form its action will take”). The concept of governmental (and particularly agency) legitimacy has received
considerable treatment. See, e.g., Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 86 (1959) (“Legitimacy involves the
capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most
appropriate or proper ones for the society.”); Emily Hammond & David Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial
Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 316 (2013). See generally Jeremy
Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718 (2016).
5
There is often a significant interaction between the mechanisms. For example, an unclear rule may complicate
subsequent enforcement or permitting efforts. See. e.g., JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA 110-111
3
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Despite the significant implications that accompany mechanism choice, agencies enjoy
broad autonomy to decide how to use the ones that are available to them to implement the
statutes they administer. They are constrained only by very limited ex ante direction (e.g.,
through statutory provisions defining the parameters of delegated discretionary authority or
budgeting) or ex post scrutiny (e.g., through oversight) from the three branches of government
whose oversight is critical to ensuring agency accountability. Congress typically gives agencies
considerable autonomy to choose among legal mechanisms.6 The Executive rarely intervenes in
agency mechanism choice. Although it has the potential indirectly to influence mechanism
choice, the limited direction provided by presidential oversight of agency rulemaking conducted
by the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) by its terms is focused on the merits (or demerits) of particular rules, not on the
underlying choice of rulemaking as the vehicle through which to pursue statutory goals.7 The
courts, often characterized as the legitimizer of agency action through review of its validity,8
have traditionally shown little interest in assessing agency mechanism choice or directing
agencies to use one mechanism rather than another.9 As Elizabeth Magill observes, “the judicial
reaction [to an agency’s choice of mechanisms] can be simply described: hands-off. An agency
can choose among its available policymaking tools and a court will not require it to provide an
explanation for its choice.”10 She concludes that agency choice of policymaking form is “not
now considered worthy of notice.”11 Taking advantage of this largely hands off posture from the
(revised ed. 2012) (noting that unclear rules “come[] home to roost when the Agency tries to write a permit or take
an enforcement action”).
6
See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974) (emphasizing the National
Labor Relations Board’s broad discretion under the National Labor Relations Act to adopt policy either through
rulemaking or adjudication); but cf. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 158 (4 th Cir. 2013)
(narrowly construing the scope of the NLRB’s rulemaking authority). See generally 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.9, at 502 (5th ed. 2010) (“Most agency-administered statutes . . . leav[e] the
agency with discretion to choose any combination of rulemaking and adjudication it prefers.”).
At a more nuanced level, each mechanism comes in various shapes and sizes, and agencies often have the
freedom to decide how best to employ a particular mechanism. See. e.g., Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power
Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133 (2014)
(analyzing the flexibility agencies may have in permitting, including the discretion to issue general permits by rule
or to permit on a case-by-case basis).
7
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013) (discussing OIRA’s
role).
8
Hammond & Markell, supra note 4, at 314.
9
See, e.g., Whitman v. Amer. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (rejecting claim that broad delegation of
authority to EPA to adopt air quality standards violated the nondelegation doctrine); Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (recognizing the SEC’s authority to apply newly adopted
standards in an adjudicatory proceeding).
10
Magill, supra note 2, at 1385 (emphasis in original); id. at 1384 (also noting that an agency’s “choice about which
tool [rulemaking or adjudication] to rely on appears, at first glance, to be unregulated by courts”). Magill notes that
this approach is inconsistent with the usual judicial requirement “that agencies provide reasoned explanations for
their discretionary choices.” Id. at 1385. Courts nevertheless indirectly influence agency mechanism choices by
“adjusting the consequences of choosing one form or another – for instance, intensifying the standard of review,
permitting a party to sue at a particular point, or shaping the procedures that must be followed. . . .” Id. In the
enforcement arena, the Supreme Court has famously held that courts have virtually no role in reviewing agency
decisions about whether to pursue enforcement in particular cases. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
11
Magill, supra note 2, at 1386. One of the purposes of her article was to begin to “notice” such choices. Id. The
limited judicial attention to agency mechanism choice undoubtedly contributes to the lack of scholarly attention.
4
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three branches, agencies have “gone about their business” of using the diverse set of
policymaking mechanisms at their disposal in “varying ways.”12
A significant challenge for those interested in these dynamics is that agency mechanism
choice occurs largely in the shadows of the administrative state, despite its importance. Perhaps
as a result, scholars’ traditional, narrow conception of “canonical administrative law” has
typically given short shrift to agency mechanism choice.13 The two principal questions we
address in this Article are meant to shed new light on this critical feature of agency
decisionmaking. First, we assess what mix of mechanisms the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) used in implementing a novel enforcement and compliance promotion initiative.14
Second, we explore why agencies chose one mechanism rather than another and what factors
influenced those choices. The limited analysis of this second question that appears in the
literature more generally has largely focused on a few key features of rulemaking and
adjudication. These include the potential of different mechanisms to influence the scope, cost
effectiveness, consistency, accessibility, flexibility, responsiveness, and capacity to address
uncertainty of regulatory initiatives. The scholarly literature suggests that agencies’ choice of
mechanism is likely to be heavily influenced by those features.15
We believe that agency mechanism choice is influenced by a more complicated set of
factors and relationships than is commonly appreciated. At least five interrelated aspects of
regulatory design are critical to achieving regulatory goals, and all of these likely bear on
mechanism choice.16 The first involves the manner in which different actors that participate (or
Id. at 1384; Shapiro, Choice, supra note 3, at 921 (noting that agency flexibility to choose among mechanisms “is
not . . . an unmixed blessing”). Professor Shapiro also observes that the “[t]he problem of choice . . . is one
confronting practically every agency. . . .” Id. at 923.
13
See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61,
62 (2015) (defining “canonical” administrative law, which “occupies the largest and most prominent positions in
treatises and the casebooks,” as “largely concerned with the role of the courts (1) in policing administrative
rulemaking and formal adjudication and (2) in enforcing agency compliance with statutes and their own rules”);
David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 236 (2010) (arguing that “administrative law
conventionally understood misses a great swath of actual administration”). We suggest that administrative law’s
reach, and the focus of administrative law scholarship, should extend well beyond the role of the courts to
encompass internal agency operations and the other key elements of policy design, such as those we discuss here.
The literature’s lack of consideration of mechanism choice is a prominent, and critical, example of the symptomatic
lack of attention to what other scholars have referred to as “internal administrative law.” See Gillian E. Metzger &
Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239 (2017).
14
In this Article, we use “EPA” as an umbrella term for both EPA and analogous state-level environmental
enforcement. See note 42, infra.
15
We review this literature, and explore the theoretical benefits and disadvantages of these two mechanisms, in a
previous Article. See Unraveling, supra note 1, at 328-49. For a relatively early review of an agency’s choice
between rulemaking and adjudication, see Shapiro, Choice, supra note 3, at 929-42 (offering several reasons why
agencies ought to use rulemaking more than was occurring at that time); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & ANNE
JOSEPH O’CONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 7 (2010) (noting that “little work
investigates the origins of private and public actors’ preferences in public law”).
16
See Unraveling, supra note 1, at 335-49 (identifying and elaborating on each of these features of effective
governance). Our five components are not intended to be exclusive. For example, budgetary resources shape
agency mechanism choice. See, e.g., Jeremy Remy Nash, J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Production Function of
the Regulatory State: How Much Do Agency Budgets Matter, 102 MINN. L. REV. 695 (2017); Eloise Pasachoff,
Controlling Agencies through the President’s Budget Process, ADMIN & REG. L. NEWS 8 (Winter 2018); cf. U.S.
Gov’t Accountability Office, Federal Regulations: Key Considerations for Agency Design and Enforcement
12

5
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have the potential to participate) in the implementation of regulatory programs may influence
mechanism choice. These include actors internal to the agency, other federal actors, other
government actors (especially in cooperative federalism systems such as those that the nation’s
environmental regulatory schemes employ),17 regulated entities, and regulatory beneficiaries.
Second, the goals an agency is supposed to achieve under its authorizing legislation have the
potential to influence mechanism choice. Third, we consider governance tools that may be
available for use by different regulatory actors, which will necessarily differ in varying
regulatory contexts. Fourth, the scope of an agency’s statutory authority (and the constraints
imposed on its exercise) can narrow or expand the range of mechanism choices available to the
agency and the relative attractiveness of these mechanisms. Finally, a series of what we refer to
as “intra-mechanism features” form part of the decisionmaking calculus.
Our contention is that both regulatory effectiveness and legitimacy are influenced by an
agency’s mechanism choices and the factors that influence them. Figure 1 below depicts the
factors that the traditional scholarship tends to highlight in considering why agencies use
particular legal mechanisms to pursue their policy agendas, and the additional factors that we
believe deserve closer attention.
Figure 1
An Expanded Array of Factors that Influence Agency Mechanism Choice

Decisions, GAO-18-22 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687875.pdf (identifying key elements of regulatory
design, including (1) regulatory objectives; (2) options for achieving them; (3) potential effectiveness; (4) risks
associated with each option; (5) enforcement implications; and (6) performance evaluation). See also David L.
Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, Dynamic Governance in Theory and Application, Part I, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 618
n.272 (2016) [hereinafter Dynamic Governance] (identifying other efforts to explore elements of policy design).
17
Under most of the federal pollution control statutes, Congress has carved out a significant role for state
participation. The allocation of authority between the federal government and the states under these laws is often
described as a form of “cooperative federalism.” States play an especially significant role in permitting and
enforcement, two of the three mechanisms that are the focus of this Article. See Robert L. Glicksman, From
Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 719, 727-54 (2006); David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our
“Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L.
REV. 347, 353-54 (1994).
6
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A framework of this kind extends beyond the limited scope of most treatments of mechanism
choice in the literature.
To test the value of our conceptual framework, we conducted an empirical study that
tracks an agency’s actual mechanism choices as it sought to advance a specific initiative.18 We
reviewed an effort by EPA to transform how it enforces and seeks to improve compliance with
the environmental laws it administers. Acknowledging significant shortcomings in the agency’s
efforts in this arena,19 in 2013 EPA leaders launched the agency’s Next Generation Compliance
(Next Gen) initiative because of their judgment that “pollution challenges require a modern
approach to compliance, taking advantage of new tools and approaches while strengthening
vigorous enforcement of environmental laws.”20 While Next Gen itself concluded as a discrete
18

Our previous work, Unraveling, supra note 1, supplies the theoretical foundation for the conceptual framework
we apply here for improving regulatory governance. This Article supplies empirical analysis of how EPA has
actually implemented a novel initiative to enhance compliance with regulatory duties and the extent to and manner
in which each of the factors in our framework has influenced that initiative.
19
See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13-115, Environmental Protection: EPA Should Develop a Strategic
Plan for Its New Compliance Initiative 1 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650711.pdf [hereinafter GAO-13115] (noting that EPA has reported that it is not achieving anticipated environmental and public health benefits
because of substantial noncompliance rates in some programs); David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic
Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1, 45, 63-64 (2014) [hereinafter Holistic] (quoting EPA
Administrator’s acknowledgment that the agency’s clean water enforcement programs were ineffective and that
noncompliance levels were unacceptably high); Dynamic Governance supra note 16, at 586, 591-92, 594 (discussing
information deficiencies, shortcomings in coordination and effectuation by states, and inadequate resources).
20
Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance, 30 ENVTL. F. 22, 22 (Sept.–Oct. 2013) [hereinafter Giles, NGC]
(noting that EPA launched Next Gen because of the need for dramatic change). According to Giles, who was then
7
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initiative in fiscal year 2017, “many of the tools and approaches continue to be relevant and
useful,” as EPA has noted.21 As a result, our findings continue to be relevant to EPA’s
enforcement-related mechanism choices. Moreover, and more importantly, our findings provide
critical insights into the factors that influence mechanism choice that are relevant to similar
choices by other agencies. We believe that our framework, and the analysis of its application to
Next Gen, can provide valuable assistance to any agency as it considers which of the
mechanisms available to it are likely to be best suited to achieving regulatory goals, and to those
overseeing agency mechanism choices and scholars reviewing their efficacy.
The vision behind EPA’s commitment to Next Gen was that it could improve
enforcement, and compliance more generally, by advancing five objectives, some of which took
advantage of dramatic developments in technological capacity: (1) increased deployment of
advanced monitoring, to improve detection of pollution generally and legal violations in
particular; (2) greater transparency, to expand the accessibility of salient compliance-related
information; (3) electronic reporting (e-reporting), to streamline and improve the gathering and
dissemination of compliance-related information; (4) use of innovative enforcement strategies,
such as third-party monitoring, to improve understanding of compliance concerns and incentivize
actions to address them; and (5) clearer rules that make compliance easier (what EPA has
referred to as “compliance built-in”).22
Our findings validate the conceptual framework for analyzing mechanism choice
reflected in Figure 1 by showing a relationship between EPA’s mechanism choices and each of
the variables in that framework. In particular, we find a relationship (which in many cases is
statistically significant) between EPA’s use of its legal mechanisms and each of the other aspects
of regulatory design in our conceptual framework. We explore whether the identity of the actors
involved affects EPA’s use of the different mechanisms. Here, we evaluate the possible impact
on mechanism choice of the involvement of different EPA officials and the Department of
Justice (DOJ).23 In addition, given that EPA issues permits to and pursues enforcement actions
the head of EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), Next Gen would “mov[e] our
compliance programs into the 21st century.” Id. Next Gen was also motivated by resource shortages. See U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NEXT GENERATION COMPLIANCE: STRATEGIC PLAN 2014-2017, 3-7 (2014),
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/next-gen-compliance-strategic-plan-2014-2017.pdf
[hereinafter EPA, NGC 2014-2017] (“Budget uncertainties and constrained resources only reinforce the imperative
to move forward with Next Generation Compliance.”); EPA Official: ‘Next Generation’ Improving Compliance, 47
ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1742 (2016) (quoting EPA official acknowledging limited inspection resources). For more on
the genesis and components of Next Gen, see Dynamic Governance, supra, note 16, at 610; David L. Markell &
Robert L. Glicksman, Next Generation Compliance, 30-Winter NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 22, 22 (2016).
21
See U.S. EPA, Next Generation Compliance, https://www.epa.gov/compliance/next-generation-compliance (last
visited Feb. 3, 2019).
22
Cynthia Giles, NGC, supra note 20, at 22; Christina Baptista, Next Generation Compliance: EPA embraces
technology and transparency to promote compliance with environmental laws, TRENDS, Jul.-Aug. 2016, at 10, 11
(characterizing rules with compliance built in as “designing rules and permits that are clear, easy to implement, and
contain self-reinforcing drivers, such as third-party verification”).
23
We also would like to have reviewed the impacts of actors’ roles in ways the data available to us did not allow.
For example, states play a critical role in environmental regulation, and we hoped to consider consistencies and
differences between and among states, but we lacked enough data about state involvement. See, e.g., Office of
Technology Assessment, Environmental Policy Tools: A User's Guide, OTA-ENV-634 130-31, at 591-94
(1995), https://ota.fas.org/reports/9517.pdf [hereinafter OTA User’s Guide] (discussing limited data on state
performance). Our empirical results suggest that the challenge of understanding state activity qualifies as an
8
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against both municipal and industrial parties, we evaluate whether the identity of the regulated
party affects how EPA has used these two mechanisms.
Second, we assess whether EPA uses its legal mechanisms differently to advance its
objectives – for example, whether it uses rulemaking more to advance one goal, such as
expanding e-reporting, while using enforcement to advance a different objective, such as
increased use of advanced monitoring. As far as we know, no one has tried to connect an
agency’s use of particular mechanisms to the use of particular regulatory tools and the
achievement of specific objectives in this way.24
Third, we evaluate whether statutory authority might affect mechanism choice. Here, we
test whether EPA’s use of mechanisms is consistent across statutory authorities, or whether
mechanism use varies depending on the statute involved. We found, for example, that EPA used
a different mix of mechanisms to enforce and foster improved compliance with different organic
statutes (e.g., more enforcement settlements and fewer regulation and permitting actions under
some statutes than others).
Finally, moving to a more nuanced level of analysis, we assess the impact on EPA
mechanism choice of “intra-mechanism” differences. For example, in some enforcement cases
EPA includes a Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP) as a “beyond compliance” strategy to
commit an alleged violator to agree to certain types of injunctive relief, while in others it does
not. We evaluate the impact of this intra-mechanism variation on other factors, such as the types
of objectives EPA sought to achieve, and the types of defendants involved in the cases.25 The
empirical findings in Part II of this Article support our hypothesis that more factors than those
that are the focus of the conventional administrative law literature affect mechanism choice.
In short, we consider mechanism choice from the perspective of not only features of the
mechanisms themselves, but also taking into account the intersection of the use of different legal
mechanisms with the other key features of administrative governance we identify above – the
actors, objectives, tools, statutory authority, and more subtle “intra-mechanism features.”26 This
analysis enriches understanding of the different dimensions that influence agency mechanism
Achilles heel for those interested in truly grappling with the workings of the administrative state. Similarly,
significant regional differences exist within EPA, but data on regional participation in Next Gen is limited. While
we offer a few observations about regional differences, this is another area that holds promise for additional
research.
24
While EPA identified five objectives in its Next Gen initiative, other objectives or strategies are possible, too.
See, e.g., OTA User’s Guide, supra note 23 (considering options for regulatory reform and innovation); U.S.
Government Accountability Office, Federal Regulations: Key Considerations for Agency Design and Enforcement
Decisions, GAO-18-22 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687875.pdf (discussing strategies such as relatively
flexible performance designs that “establish an outcome but allow flexibility in how to achieve it,” more prescriptive
design-based regulations that “specify “a certain technology, and compliance assistance).
25
See infra Part IIB.8.
26
Brian Galle has suggested that “[g]overning in the twenty-first century . . . is a problem of incentive design.
Regulators often know what they want, but not how best to achieve it.” Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante
Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1716 (2017). Mechanism choice is one dimension of this challenge. Our
conceptual framework, supported by our empirical findings, reinforces the complexity of the challenge. Our study
reveals other challenges to effective governance as well, including challenges due to less-than-complete data, and
significant coordination barriers.
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choice and paves the way for further research aimed at increasing understanding of these
dimensions and their implications for the effectiveness and legitimacy of regulatory governance.
Part II of the Article provides our case study of EPA’s use of its legal mechanisms to
implement Next Gen. After explaining our methodology, this Part provides our findings
concerning how EPA used the legal mechanisms available to it to implement Next Gen. It shows
the significant relationship between EPA’s choice of mechanisms to advance Next Gen and the
variables we identify in our conceptual framework.
In Part III we consider possible motivations for EPA’s mechanism choices, in an effort to
explain why EPA made the decisions it did. Further, we explain why it is important to
understand what drives agency mechanism choice because of its implications for core values of
the administrative state such as transparency, accountability, participation, deliberation,
effectiveness, and efficiency.
Part IV concludes by highlighting that the fundamental value of this project lies in the
importance of the questions it raises even more than in the specific answers available at this point
to explain EPA’s actions in its implementation of Next Gen. Although the components of other
regulatory programs will differ from the use of EPA’s enforcement and compliance-related
authorities, our study of Next Gen provides a template (or at least a starting point) for similar
analysis of mechanism choice in other regulatory contexts.27
II.

A Case Study of EPA’s Use of Legal Mechanisms in a Novel Enforcement and
Compliance Venture

This Part explains our methodology in identifying legal mechanisms (rules, enforcement
settlements, and permits) that EPA or a state has used to advance EPA’s Next Gen initiative. It
then details how EPA and the states have used these mechanisms to advance Next Gen.
A. Methodology
We identified 130 instances in which EPA or a state used enforcement, rulemaking, or
permitting to advance Next Gen objectives – 87 enforcement settlements, 26 regulations, and 17
permits.28 EPA posted 84 of the 87 settlements in a series of eight compilations of Next Gen

We agree with the cautionary note expressed by Professors Farber and O’Connell about the importance of
context. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Introduction: A Brief Trajectory of Public Choice and
Public Law, in FARBER & O’CONNELL, supra note 15, at 8-9 (recommending that “any normative analysis should be
particularized to specific institutional arrangements and actors…. [W]e should be wary of normative
recommendations that fail to pay close attention to context.”); cf. Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in id. at 345
(“the best public choice scholarship shows that global claims about the normative status of delegation are
nonsensical. Evaluation must be localized and sensitive to the institutional variation . . . . ”).
28
We refer to these 130 instances as “instruments” throughout this Article. On December 30, 2018, we ran a search
with the terms “Next Generation” /s enforcement compliance in the following databases: All States (Cases), EPA
Title V Final Orders, EPA Regional Decisions, EPA Environmental Appeals Board, and APA Administrative Law
Judge Decisions. This search turned up no relevant documents. We also searched the All Federal (Cases) database
using the terms EPA and “Next Generation” and turned up no relevant decisions.
27
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activity that it issued beginning in 2015.29 We identified three additional settlements that include
Next Gen features through our own research.30 EPA has posted five compendia that list legal
EPA designates four of these as “Settlement Highlights” for Next Gen. These four lists only include settlements
that incorporate Next Gen features, and do not include permits or regulations. The lists include settlements under
the range of statutes EPA administers. U.S. EPA, Next Generation Compliance: Enforcement Settlement Highlights
(last edited Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-01/documents/nextgenenfsettlementhighlights.pdf [hereinafter Settlement Highlights, Jan. 2015]; U.S. EPA, Next Generation Compliance:
Enforcement Settlement Highlights (last edited May 23, 2016 ) [hereinafter Settlement Highlights, May 2016]; U.S.
EPA, Next Generation Compliance: Enforcement Settlement Highlights (last edited Sept. 8, 2016) [hereinafter
Settlement Highlights, Sept. 2016]; U.S. EPA, Next Generation Compliance: Enforcement Settlement Highlights
(last edited December 20, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/documents/nextgenenfsettlementhighlights.pdf [hereinafter Settlement Highlights, Dec. 2016].
The other four compilations are statute-based. Each lists the suite of Next Gen enforcement settlements,
permits, and regulations undertaken under a particular statute. Two of the compilations list Next Gen matters under
the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA, Appendix to NPDES Compendium of Next Generation Compliance Examples (last
edited Sept. 29, 2015) [hereinafter NPDES 2015 Compendium Appendix]; U.S. EPA, NPDES Compendium of Next
Generation Compliance Examples (last edited Sept. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201506/documents/npdesnextgencomplcompendium.pdf [hereinafter NPDES 2016 Compendium]; U.S. EPA, Appendix
to NPDES Compendium of Next Generation Compliance Examples (last edited Sept. 2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/npdesnextgencomplcompendium-appendix.pdf
[hereinafter NPDES 2016 Compendium Appendix]. A third compilation is for Next Gen activity under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), U.S. EPA, RCRA Compendium of Next Generation Compliance
Examples (last edited Sept. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201609/documents/rcranextgencomplcompendium.pdf [hereinafter RCRA Compendium]; U.S. EPA, Appendix to RCRA
Compendium of Next Generation Compliance Examples (last edited Sept. 2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/rcranextgencomplcompendium-appendix.pdf;
[hereinafter RCRA Compendium Appendix]. The fourth compilation is for such activity under the Clean Air Act.
U.S. EPA, Compendium of Next Generation Compliance Examples in Clean Air Act Programs (last edited Sept.
2016 ), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/caanextgencomplcompendium.pdf
[hereinafter CAA Compendium]; U.S. EPA, Appendix to Compendium of Next Generation Compliance Examples in
Clear [sic] Air Act Programs (last edited Sept. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201609/documents/caanextgencomplcompendium-appendix.pdf; [hereinafter CAA Compendium Appendix].
In reviewing EPA’s compilations, we noted that six settlements appear on earlier lists but not on later lists:
In the Matter of Wilcox Farms, Inc.; Alpha Natural Resources; City of Fall River; CITGO; U.S. v. Titanium Metals
Corp., U.S. v. Roquette America. We included these six in our data base based on our understanding that EPA
believes the six continue to qualify as Next Gen settlements. Jon Silberman, Feb. 8, 2017 e-mail to David Markell.
We also reviewed two articles that EPA officials have published concerning Next Gen, neither of which identified
any settlements not included on one of EPA’s eight lists. Giles, NGC, supra note 16; David A. Hindin & Jon D.
Silberman, Designing More Effective Rules and Permits, 7 GEO. WASH. J. U. J. ENERGY & ENV'T 103 (2016).
30
EPA is clear in its compilations that its lists are “illustrative, not exhaustive.” See, e.g., Settlement Highlights,
Dec. 2016, supra note 29; Silberman email, supra note 29. We conducted searches for additional Next Gen
settlements in three EPA websites, through January 31, 2017: EPA.gov, ECHO Enforcement Case Search
https://echo.epa.gov/facilities/enforcement-case-search?srch=adv, and EPA Enforcement Civil Cases and
Settlements, https://cfpub.epa.gov/enforcement/cases/. We searched the EPA databases using “Next Generation”
and “Next Gen” to see if any summaries or press releases specifically used this terminology. We also searched
Westlaw and Bloomberglaw’s dockets using search terms “next gen!,” “advanced monitoring,” “e-reporting,” and
variations of these terms. We are grateful to Katie Miller, reference librarian, Florida State University College of
Law, for conducting these searches. The three settlements we discovered through this series of searches involve
U.S. v. Tonawanda Coke Corp., Consent Decree, (W.D.N.Y. May 11, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/enrd/pages/attachments/2015/05/11/tonawanda_consent_decree_with_app
endices.pdf; U.S. v. HollyFrontier Refining & Marketing LLC., Consent Decree (1:15-cv-02024) (D.C. Dist. Nov.
19, 2015); U.S. & The Commonwealth of PA, Dept. of Env. Prot. v. DE County Reg. Water Quality Control
Authority (DELCORA) Consent Decree, (E.D.P.A. Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/delawarecounty-regional-water-quality-control-authority-clean-water-act-settlement. The EPA press releases and summaries
29
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mechanisms that include Next Gen features, two for actions under the Clean Water Act
(CWA),31 a third for actions under the Clean Air Act (CAA),32 a fourth for actions under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),33 and a fifth for actions under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), RCRA,
and state clean-up authorities.34 These Compendia provided the starting point for our effort to
identify rules that advance Next Gen ideas, listing a total of twelve rules that include Next Gen
features. Of those, nine are state regulations.35 We identified an additional fourteen federal
regulations that include Next Gen features through a search of the Federal Register, and
additional legal research.36 EPA’s five statute-specific Compendia identified 17 permits that use
Next Gen tools.37
announcing the HollyFrontier and DELCORA settlements specifically reference the Next Gen character of the
settlements. https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/reference-news-release-us-settles-gasoline-refiner-reduce-emissionsutah-facility; https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/delaware-county-regional-water-quality-control-authority-cleanwater-act-settlement#nextgen. We determined that the Tonawanda Coke settlement included Next Gen features
based on our review of John Haerzfeld, Tonawanda Coke Agrees to Pay $12 Million in Civil Case, Brings Total to
$42 Million, 46 ENV’T REP. 1470 (May 15, 2015) (describing the third-party auditing features as consistent with
Next Generation enforcement). While our database includes more Next Gen settlements than EPA has posted in its
compilations, we recognize that we may not have found them all.
31
NPDES Compendium, Sept. 2015, supra note 29; NPDES Compendium, Sept. 2016, supra note 29.
32
Clean Air Act Compendium, supra note 29.
33
RCRA Compendium, supra note 29. These statutes are the major federal pollution control regulatory statutes.
34
U.S. EPA, Next Generation Cleanup Compendium of Examples (last edited Sept. 2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-10/documents/cleanupnextgencomplcompendium.pdf.
35
The affected states are California, Connecticut, Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
and Oregon. All but the Colorado, California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey regulations are listed in the NDPES
Compendium & Annex. The Colorado regulation is listed in the RCRA Compendium and Appendix, and the other
three states’ regulations are listed in the Cleanup Compendium.
36
To find the rules and regulations with Next Gen features, first we reviewed each of the following documents:
Next Generation Cleanup Compendium of Examples, supra note 29; Settlement Highlights, Dec. 2016, supra note
29; Clean Air Compendium, supra note 19; Clean Air Compendium Appendix, supra note 29; RCRA Compendium
supra note 29; RCRA Compendium Appendix, supra note 29; NPDES 2016 Compendium, supra note 29; NPDES
2015 Compendium Appendix, supra note 29; NPDES 2016 Compendium, supra note 29. We also referred to Giles,
NGC supra note 20; Hindin & Silberman, supra note 29; and Dynamic Governance, supra note 29. We searched
the following websites: federalregister.gov, epa.gov (including EPA’s nascent (beta stage) “Professional Search”
function”), nepis.gov.epa, fdsys.gov, ecfr.gov, and reginfo.gov using each of the following terms: “Next Gen,”
“Next Generation,” “fence line,” “fenceline,” “fence-line,” “emissions,” enhanced monitoring,” “advanced
monitoring,” “e-reporting,” and “electronic reporting.” In addition, we searched Westlaw’s Administrative
Decisions Environmental Protection Agency materials for one of the foregoing terms occurring within the same
document as rul!, regul!, or settl! (where ! represents all letters after the root of the searched term, thereby capturing
all variations). Further, we searched the Federal Digital System (www.gpo.gov/fdsys) (currently found at
https://www.govinfo.gov) and ecfr.gov (electronic version of the Code of Federal Regulation but not the official
C.F.R.) to provide a cross-check on what we found in the Federal Register. Barbara Kaplan, Research Librarian,
Florida State University College of Law, conducted this search and we are grateful for her efforts. We identified
several proposed rules that incorporate Next Gen tools, but we have only coded the rules that are final.
Because, according to EPA officials, the Compendia are not intended to provide comprehensive lists of the
use of the three key legal mechanisms to advance Next Gen goals, we did not expect the Compendia to include all of
the rules that use Next Gen tools. See Silberman email, supra note 29.
37
A member of EPA’s Next Generation Compliance Team advised us to rely on the Compendia for information on
permits that include Next Gen features. Christina Baptista, EPA Next Generation Compliance Team, e-mail to
Katrina M. Miller (Sept. 8, 2016) (noting, in response to an e-mail from Ms. Miller asking if there is a
comprehensive list of permits that use Next Gen tools, that she did not believe EPA has a comprehensive list of
permits with Next Gen, and that once the Compendia are available, “you will be able to see what EPA HQ is aware
of in terms of permits with Next Gen”). We asked EPA for advice about how best to search EPA databases
12
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We coded each enforcement settlement, regulation, and permit identified as relevant to
Next Gen to reflect each instrument’s incorporation of one or more of EPA’s five Next Gen
tools: (1) advanced monitoring, (2) e-reporting, (3) transparency, (4) compliance built in, and (5)
innovative enforcement.38 EPA itself documents the Next Gen features for 25 of the 87
settlements, and EPA documents the Next Gen features in all of the permits in our database.39 In
our coding we largely deferred to EPA’s characterizations of these settlements and permits,
although we conducted our own independent review of these items. We coded the remaining
settlements and regulations, for which EPA did not provide any guidance, ourselves.40
including Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) and the Permit Compliance Systems and Integrated
Compliance Information System (PCS-ICIS) databases for permits that include Next Gen tools. The ECHO website
allows users to search facilities to determine compliance with environmental regulations and allows facilities to be
narrowed by water or air permits. ECHO contains the PCS-ICIS databases, which contain information about
companies holding National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits under the CWA. EPA
officials advised us that the agency does not require states to identify Next Gen features in permits, so that its
databases do not include that information. See, e.g., Katrina M. Miller e-mail to Catherine Tunis, EPA Next
Generation Compliance Team (Sept. 8, 2016); Catherine Tunis e-mail to Katrina M. Miller (Sept. 8, 2016) (also
recommending the Compendia as sources of information about the use of permitting to advance Next Gen tools).
This sub-total of permits obviously represents an extremely small subset of permits issued by EPA and the states.
See, e.g., Analyze Trends: State Water Dashboard, http://echo.epa.gov/trends/comparative-maps-dashboards/statewater-dashboard?state=National&view=activity.
We note that, because Next Gen is a relatively new regulatory innovation, and because of the exploratory
nature of our analysis, our sample sizes are small. In particular, we note that the sample includes only 17 permits,
many of them state-issued (as are many of the regulations that we uncovered). The nature of the sample limits some
of the empirical analyses that we can perform, and we urge caution in interpreting these exploratory findings.
38
These are the categories Assistant Administrator Giles used in the article that helped launch Next Gen. Giles,
NGC, supra note 20, at 22-24.
39
Each compendium contains a chart that specifies the Next Gen feature(s) EPA identifies as included in each
settlement. NPDES 2015 Compendium Appendix, supra note 29; NPDES 2016 Compendium Appendix, supra note
29; Clean Air Act Compendium Appendix, supra note 29; RCRA Compendium Appendix, supra note 29. We coded
one case, Lynx Enterprise, which was discussed in the text of the RCRA compendium, but was not listed on the
RCRA compendium appendix.
40
Coding was conducted by Professors Glicksman and Markell and two law librarians. A pilot study of inter-coder
reliability sampled 414 points of agreement or disagreement across approximately 30% of the 130 Next Gen items in
our database and revealed an inter-coder reliability of 91.30%. Accounting for chance agreement among coders, the
Cohen’s Kappa value was 0.83, suggesting no significant reliability problems. Any coding disagreements were later
resolved through mutual consultation and cross-checking. We reviewed the EPA summaries in the agency-posted
Settlement Highlights and, as necessary, the EPA press release and other materials for which EPA provided links in
those Highlights. We coded a settlement as including the “e-reporting” Next Gen tool if the settlement required the
regulated party to report to EPA electronically, such as by submitting the discharge monitoring reports (DMRs)
required under the CWA to EPA electronically. See, e.g. U.S. and State of Maine v. City of Bangor, which requires
electronic data submission with real-time data on electronic-flow monitoring from all of the City’s significant CSO
outfalls. We coded a settlement as including the “transparency” tool if it required the regulated party to post
information that would be available to the public via a website or otherwise. See, e.g., In the Matter of: Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., which requires maintaining a hazardous waste electronic database available to all workers to help
identify hazardous wastes. We only coded a settlement as involving a supplemental environmental project (SEP) if
the SEP itself required the Next Gen feature. For example, we coded U.S. v. Total Petroleum Puerto Rico as
including a SEP because EPA’s settlement highlight states, “Total Petroleum agreed to pay a $426,000 penalty,
implement compliance measures valued at approximately $1 million, and undertake a $600,000 Supplemental
Environmental Project (SEP). Consistent with Next Generation Compliance principles, the injunctive relief requires
Total Petroleum to install fully-automated electronic release detection monitoring systems at 137 of its facilities with
USTs.” We confirmed in the consent decree that this injunctive relief is the SEP. In contrast, we did not code U.S.
v. County of Westchester (Westchester Co., NY), as having a SEP because the SEP does not contain any Next Gen
13
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We coded several additional variables for each instrument in order to evaluate possible
relationships between use of legal mechanisms by relevant governmental actors and other
features of our conceptual framework. We coded the regulatory program(s) in play for each
mechanism to assess whether there are variations in how legal mechanisms implement regulatory
policy objectives (Next Gen tool advancement) under different statutes (in the vast majority of
cases, settlements were negotiated under the CAA, CWA, or RCRA).41 For enforcement
settlements, we coded the government actors involved in each settlement (EPA, in some cases
DOJ, and in some cases specific EPA Regions) in an effort to explore whether the identity of
these actors influences policy implementation (here, incorporation of Next Gen tools in
settlements). In addition, we coded the identity of the settling party (industrial or municipal).
We coded permits in the same manner with respect to the identity of the party.
Finally, we included an additional coding item for enforcement settlements to capture
whether EPA included a SEP.42 As with coding for the particular actors involved in each
settlement (EPA alone vs. EPA/DOJ, the particular EPA region involved, and identity of the
defendants), this more nuanced coding makes possible an “intra-mechanism” comparative
analysis of EPA’s use of different forms of enforcement settlements.43
B. A Comparative Assessment of the Three Key Legal Mechanisms
This Section details eight sets of key findings about EPA’s use of its legal mechanisms to
advance Next Gen that emerged from this study. These findings are novel for two reasons. First,
as indicated above, we have explored factors that have the capacity to influence mechanism
choice that have not been studied before, at least not in a systematic effort to assess how they
affect the use of a particular set of agency tools or the pursuit of identified policy objectives.
Second, we have made a first cut at applying our conceptual framework’s five variables that may
influence mechanism choice to each of these findings. Thus, for example, in addition to our
finding that EPA has used enforcement settlements far more than any other mechanism to
advance Next Gen (Finding 1), we have provided a provisional explanation for this finding by

features (the SEP involved “(i) increas[ing] the number of days during which unused pharmaceuticals and hazardous
household chemicals will be accepted from residents of Water District No. 1 at Westchester’s Household Materials
Recovery Facility or at other designated sites and (ii) . . . purchas[ing] at least $100,000 worth of 55-gallon rain
barrels for residential collection and storage of roof rainwater runoff, to be distributed to residents of Water District
No. 1.” https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-consent-decree-resolvingwestchester-county-s.
We only coded cases with the “compliance built in” designation if EPA indicated that the case included
compliance built in. See https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-01/documents/memo-nextgenuseinenfsettlements.pdf (defining each of the tools).
41
For this reason, we do not analyze instruments created under CERCLA in the remainder of this Article. We coded
the date of each settlement to explore whether EPA’s approaches to policy implementation (advancement of Next
Gen tools) has evolved over time. We excluded from our analyses use of Next Gen tools that involved more than
one statute.
42
See infra note 105 and accompanying text for a discussion of SEPs.
43
In addition to EPA Next Gen items, our database includes a small number of state-related Next Gen items. When
we say “EPA’s” use of Next Gen tools, “EPA” is an umbrella term for both EPA and analogous state-level
environmental enforcement, unless we have specifically excluded the state items in our database from the analysis.
14
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linking it to the five key factors that we believe deserve a closer look for their potential influence
on mechanism choice.44
Finding 1. Relative Use of the Different Legal Mechanisms. Of the 130 instances in
which EPA or a state used enforcement, rulemaking, or permitting to advance Next Gen
objectives, 87 were enforcement settlements, 26 were regulations,45 and 17 were permits, as
noted above.46 Thus, EPA used enforcement far more than either of the other mechanisms to
advance its Next Gen objectives.47
Finding 2. Mean Incorporation of Next Gen Tools Per Instrument. We did not find a
meaningful difference in the mean number of Next Gen tools EPA used based on the type of
instrument involved.48 The mean number of tools used per enforcement settlement was 1.47,
44

We cannot overstate the provisional and tentative nature of this initial effort. Our explanations are intended to be
illustrative rather than comprehensive or final. For example, our data set is limited, especially in the context of
permitting, given that the number of permits containing Next Gen features is miniscule in relation to the number of
permits issued each year by EPA and the states under the statutes we studied. For another, the time period in which
Next Gen was in effect as an ongoing agency initiative was relatively short, which may have limited the initiative’s
capacity to filter down from EPA, its creator, to the states, which handle the lion’s share of permitting and
enforcement actions. In light of EPA’s statement that it anticipates further use of individual Next Gen components,
see supra note 21 and accompanying text, the data we explore likely do not comprise the final universe of the use of
Next Gen tools in rulemaking, permitting, or enforcement. Finally, we expect others would have filled in the boxes
in Figure 2 below differently than we have done. Compiling similar summaries of the relationship between agency
mechanism use and the features of regulatory design reflected in Figure 1 above requires an understanding of the
factors that influence mechanism choice that we hope our project will help to foster. The combination of our
conceptual framework and case study provide a basis for strengthening that understanding.
45
EPA has long-embraced rulemaking as a centrally important policymaking mechanism. GLICKSMAN & LEVY,
supra note 1, at 267 (“EPA is one of the most prolific sources of regulations . . . .”). The agency’s track record
during the time period covered by this case study – proposing 238 rules and finalizing 190 rules between Fall 2013
and Fall 2016 – reflects its extensive use of this mechanism. Historical Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaHistory. [KM, need to use same time period]. From the inception of
Next Gen, EPA has embraced rulemaking as a critical legal mechanism for advancing Next Gen ideas. It identifies
the use of rules as one of the five central elements of the Next Gen initiative. Giles, NGC, supra note 20, at 22-24.
46
See supra note 28 and accompanying text. We used January 31, 2017 as the cut-off date for finding new Next
Gen cases, rules, or permits. Our references to Fall 2016 in footnote 45 refer to the EPA’s Unified Agenda, which is
published only in the fall and spring of each year. The statistics in the Fall 2016 issue of the Unified Agenda were
the latest before our January 31, 2017 cut-off date.
47
During the time period we cover in our study, from January 1, 2013, through January 31, 2017, EPA finalized a
total of 9,493 civil administrative and judicial cases. We found these statistics by searching the EPA’s ECHO
database of enforcement cases, https://echo.epa.gov/facilities/enforcement-case-search. We searched for civil cases,
with EPA as the case lead, in which either a final order was entered in a judicial case or a final order was issued in
an administrative case between January 1, 2013 and January 31, 2017.
48
Wald (2, N = 130) = 1.15, p = .562. We analyzed the data using a specialized Poisson regression for “count” data.
See, e.g., A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA (2d. ed. 2012)
(providing detailed commentary on the Poisson regression). This type of regression produces a “Wald value” with
an associated “p-value,” to determine whether the differences among the count data from specific groups is
statistically meaningful. Id. Wald tests, t-tests, chi-square tests, and F-tests (which are also included in the analyses
that follow) are all test statistics that yield p-values.
Differences between groups are significant if the statistical tests indicate that the likelihood that the
difference observed would occur by chance is 5% or less (as indicated by the p-value as p < 0.05). A difference is
“marginally significant” if the likelihood of seeing such a difference by chance is greater than 5% but less than 10%.
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 485
n.117 (2003) (citing BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2d ed.
15
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with a range of 1 to 3. The picture looks much the same for rulemaking (mean of 1.77 tools per
rule) and permitting (mean of 1.53 tools per permit). EPA typically was quite selective in its
incorporation of Next Gen objectives into its legal mechanisms.49 Because this finding does not
suggest that any particular factor was especially salient as an influence on the mean use of tools
in a particular mechanism, we do not discuss it further.
Finding 3. Association of Instrument Identity and Next Gen Objectives Advanced.50
As Figure 2 indicates, we found that EPA’s use of different Next Gen tools varies significantly
by mechanism. In other words, there is a statistically significant interaction between the type of
legal mechanism used and the likelihood of specific tool usage.51 Table 1 provides the details.
With settlements, EPA was significantly more likely to use advanced monitoring (used in 66.7%
of settlements) and transparency (included in 43.7% of settlements) than all other Next Gen tools
(used in only 15, 12, and 6 percent of settlements).52 For permits, in contrast, EPA was more
likely to include advanced monitoring, transparency, and e-reporting (as a group, each in the 4060 percent range), than innovative enforcement and compliance built in (as a group, each is
included in less than 6 percent of the permits).53 For regulations, EPA included transparency,
compliance built-in, and e-reporting regularly (each is included in more than 40 percent of the
Next Gen rules), more than it has incorporated advanced monitoring or innovative enforcement
(each less than 25 percent of the time).54 Thus, EPA included advanced monitoring as a
1989)). Because of the small size of our database, we also report “trending” effects, which are not quite marginal.
We would need more data for those “trending” differences to reach statistical significance, because we lacked the
statistical power with this data set to claim that they are reliable. Other researchers may be able to do so with larger
data sets if Next Gen tools are employed more frequently in the future. See, e.g., Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power
Analysis, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 98 (1992).
49
The choice of whether to include any tools and, if so, which ones, in particular instruments was by no means
EPA’s alone. In judicial settlements, DOJ obviously also had a voice on behalf of the government. For settlements
generally, the alleged violators’ agreement to incorporation of particular tools was also an indispensable element of
each of the settlements, and permit applicants similarly potentially had some say. The question of how much
EPA/DOJ pushed particular tools in specific situations, and the extent and strength of NGO preferences, deserve
further attention. The same is true for permitting.
50
In this section, we analyzed the presence or absence of particular Next Gen tools via a series of binomial probit
regressions (with the five Next Gen tools serving as repeated measures, and their presence or absence serving as the
binary outcome measure, in a mixed design). We performed these calculations via the Generalized Estimating
Equations function of the SPSS statistical software. Where applicable, the models that follow include main effects
as well as the predicted interaction effect. For purposes of simplicity, where we have predicted an interactive effect
in this section, we report only the results of the test for the interaction.
51
Wald (7, N = 650) = 51.40, p < .001 (interaction effect). Advanced monitoring was more likely to be used than
innovative enforcement (95% confidence interval: 0.33, 0.54), e-reporting (0.29, 0.50), transparency (0.01, 0.24),
and compliance built-in (0.29, 0.50). Transparency was more likely to be used than innovative enforcement (0.20,
0.41), e-reporting (0.16, 0.38), and compliance built-in (0.16, 0.38). We note that our dataset contained, in addition
to data from EPA, 14 state-level Next Gen items. None of these items was a settlement, nine were regulations and
the other five were permits.
52
Wald (4, N = 435) = 97.08, p < .001 (simple effect). Advanced monitoring was included in 58 out of 87
settlements and transparency in 38 out of 87 settlements. Innovative enforcement, compliance built-in, and ereporting were included much less often.
53
Wald (3, N = 85) = 7.86, p = .049 (simple effect).
54
Wald (4, N = 130) = 12.94, p = .012 (simple effect). E-Reporting is part of a larger initiative known as EEnterprise for the Environment. See Memorandum from Bob Perciasepe to Assistant Administrators, etc., EReporting Policy Statement for EPA Regulations (Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201603/documents/epa-ereporting-policy-statement-2013-09-30.pdf (noting that “[m]oving from paper to electronic
reporting is a key component of E-Enterprise. . . .”). EPA has noted that “[w]hile e-reporting reduces paper
16
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requirement in over half of Next Gen settlements and permits, but in less than a quarter of
regulations. EPA only included e-reporting in 5.7 percent of enforcement settlements, while it
included e-reporting as a requirement in roughly 40 percent of Next Gen regulations and permits.
Similarly, EPA rarely included compliance built-in as a requirement in its settlements and
permits, but compliance built-in tied with transparency as the most prevalent requirement in Next
Gen regulations.
Figure 2
Likelihood of Tool Usage (by Mechanism and by Next Gen Tool/Objective)
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Table 1
Likelihood of Tool Usage (by Mechanism and by Next Gen Tool/Objective)
Advanced

Innovative

E-Report

Transparency

Built-In

Settlements

66.7

14.9

5.7

43.7

11.5

Permits

58.8

0.0

41.2

47.1

5.9

Regulations

23.1

19.2

42.3

46.2

46.2

Our finding that there are statistically significant variations in how an agency used
different legal mechanisms to advance its objectives supports our hypothesis that there is far
more to agency mechanism choice than the traditional mechanism-feature factors that scholars

transaction costs associated with creating, mailing, entering, and error correction, it also necessitates new efforts to
create the necessary tools to assist the regulated source in submitting quality reports and software to accept the
electronic submittals.” NPDES 2015 Compendium Appendix, supra note 29, at 13.
17

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3351105

have highlighted.55 It appears that not only did mechanism-specific features influence how EPA
has used different tools to advance Next Gen, but also that differences in the tools themselves
may have influenced how EPA has used its legal mechanisms to advance the tools. We are not
aware of any other effort to assess possible links between an agency’s choice of legal mechanism
and a particular agency objective, such as EPA’s effort to advance the use of the five Next Gen
tools. These findings take us into uncharted waters, at least in the law review literature, and
reinforce the value of considering a far broader, and more nuanced, set of factors that may
motivate agency mechanism choice than we have seen in previous analysis.
Finding 4. Interaction Between the Mechanism Used and the Governing Statute. This
finding breaks down EPA’s use of different legal mechanisms to advance Next Gen tools and
objectives by using a statutory lens. Our finding here is that an interaction exists between the
mechanism used and the governing statute.56 In other words, EPA used the available legal
mechanisms to advance Next Gen tools differently under the three regulatory statutes that
provide the legal landscape for Next Gen’s development and implementation, the CAA, CWA,
and RCRA. When EPA included a Next Gen tool under the CAA, it was very likely to use an
enforcement settlement to do so (nearly 73% of the instruments under the CAA were
settlements). It was much less likely to use a regulation (only 22.9% of the CAA mechanisms),
or a permit (only 4.2% of the instruments used).57 EPA used permits and rules more, and
settlements less, under the CWA in comparison to its use of these mechanisms under the CAA.
Approximately 56% of the instruments under the CWA were settlements, 31% were permits
(31.3%), and only 12.5% were rules.58 EPA’s use of mechanisms under RCRA follows a pattern
that is different in statistically significant ways from its approach under the CAA or CWA.
Under RCRA, settlements were (again) used the most (66.7%), followed by rules (33.3%). No
permits were employed under RCRA (0%) to advance the use of Next Gen tools.59 Thus, while
55

Though we focus here on the relationship between tool selection and mechanism choice, we do not mean to
exclude the possibility that our other variables (e.g., different preferences by different regulated parties, the
involvement of DOJ, differences in statutory authority, or intra-mechanism features) may have influenced the
connection between mechanisms used and tools employed that Finding 3 reflects. Thus, we have been conservative
in completing the charts in this Article in positing that particular factors have influenced EPA’s mechanism choices.
56
Chi-square (4, N = 111) = 20.09, p < .001. (Fisher’s Exact Test = 17.20, p = .001). A chi-square analysis
determines whether two or more proportions are statistically different from one another. When the proportions
involve small sample sizes, the “Fisher’s Exact Test” statistic is used instead. See, e.g., R. A. Fisher, On the
Interpretation of χ2 from Contingency Tables, and the Calculation of P, 85 J. OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC’Y 87
(1922). We excluded from the analysis 19 “hybrid” Next Gen cases that could not be classified as ones that were
brought solely under the CAA, the CWA, or RCRA. We therefore evaluated 111 cases in this analysis.
57
Settlements were more likely to be used under the CAA than were regulations (confidence interval: 0.33, 0.67)
and permits (confidence interval: 0.55, 0.83). Regulations were used under the CAA more often than were permits
(confidence interval: 0.06, 0.32). We again caution readers in interpreting the absolute percentages reported on
account of the smaller sample size for permits. In smaller sample sizes, a one-unit increase or decrease in the
number of permits will yield a more dramatic increase or decrease in the absolute percentages of permits compared
to settlements, for example; nonetheless, the statistical tests we employed account for sample size, and the difference
in proportions across legal mechanisms was statistically significant.
58
Settlements were more likely to be used under the CWA than were permits (confidence interval: 0.06, 0.44) and
regulations (0.27, 0.61). Permits were more likely to be used under the CWA than were regulations (confidence
interval: 0.03, 0.35).
59
Settlements were more likely to be used under RCRA than were permits (confidence interval: 0.43, 0.91).
Regulations were more likely to be used under RCRA than were permits (confidence interval: 0.09, 0.57). There
was no statistical difference, however, between the likelihood of the use of settlements and regulations under RCRA
(confidence interval: -0.01, 0.67).
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EPA used settlements most frequently under all three statutes, the percentage use of settlements
was lower under the CWA than under the other two statutes. In addition, EPA used rules less
frequently under the CWA than under the other two laws, and EPA’s use of permits differed
dramatically, comprising nearly a third of the uses of Next Gen tools under the CWA but not at
all under RCRA. Figure 3 and Table 3 reflect these differences. The differences in how EPA
used each mechanism under the different statutes to advance Next Gen tools are statistically
significant.60
Figure 3
Next Gen Mechanism % by Governing Statute
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Table 2
Next Gen Mechanism % by Governing Statute
Settlements

Permits

Regulations

CAA

72.9

4.2

22.9

CWA

56.3

31.3

12.5

RCRA

66.7

0.0

33.3

We also considered a more fine-grained question: whether EPA used each of its
mechanisms to advance particular Next Gen tools differently under the statutes and found

60

See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text (describing differences in the distribution of EPA administrative
versus judicial settlements under the different statutes (the CAA and RCRA are about 50-50 administrative versus
judicial, while the CWA is only 4% administrative, with the remaining 96% of the settlements being judicial).
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significant differences.61 In other words, we know that EPA uses mostly settlements to advance
Next Gen under the CAA. But in those settlements, is EPA more likely to rely on advanced
monitoring than it is, for example, under the CWA?
For enforcement settlements, EPA is somewhat more likely to incorporate advanced
monitoring features into settlements under the CAA than is the case for settlements under the
CWA and RCRA.62 In contrast, EPA is less likely to incorporate the Next Gen tool of ereporting into CAA settlements than is the case for RCRA settlements.63 For rulemaking, the
only difference in tool usage by statute is the compliance built-in feature,64 which is less likely
to be used under the CWA than under the CAA and RCRA.65 We found no general interactive
effect of statute and tool usage with respect to permits.66 The post-hoc analysis confirmed no
meaningful differences in tool usage based on statute for permits.67 While EPA’s use of tools
varies substantially by statute, the small sample size does not allow for any conclusions
concerning the significance of such differences. We expect that additional sample data would
produce significant findings that EPA’s use of particular tools varies by statute.
Figure 4
Next Gen Tool Usage by Statute (Settlements)

61

Wald (22, N = 555) = 1774.18, p < .001 (significant three-way interaction among relevant statute, legal
mechanism, and Next Gen tool). We examined this interaction by examining the pattern of Next Gen tool usage
under the different statutes first with respect to enforcement settlements, then regulations, and then permits.
62
Wald (6, N = 360) = 318.32, p < .001 (simple interaction of statute and Next Gen tool); Wald (1, N = 72) = 7.00, p
= .03 (simple effect of Next Gen tool); Wald (1, N = 72) = 6.73, p = .009 (planned comparison of advanced
monitoring usage under the CAA and CWA).
63
Wald (1, N = 72) = 2.98, p = .089 (planned comparison of transparency usage under the CAA and RCRA). We
also note that the EPA used the compliance built-in tool under only the CAA.
64
Wald (1, N = 22) = 4.67, p = .097 (simple effect of Next Gen tool).
65
For example, B = 1.57, SE = 0.73, Wald (1, N = 22) = 3.00, p = .031 (planned comparison of compliance builtin under the CAA and the CWA with respect to rulemaking). We note that the EPA used the advanced
monitoring tool only under the CAA (and not under CWA or RCRA) with respect to rulemaking.
66
Because of the small size of our database, we were unable to compute any other calculations with respect to our
data on permits.
67
Although not a statistically significant finding in this sample of Next Gen permits, it is worth noting that ereporting was required in roughly 30% of permits under the CWA; it was not required under any permits under the
CAA or RCRA.
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Table 3
Next Gen Tool Usage by Statute (Settlements)
Advanced

Innovative

E-Report

Transparency

Built-In

CAA

82.9

20.0

2.9

28.6

17.1

CWA

51.9

14.8

7.4

59.3

0.0

RCRA

60.0

10.0

20.0

60.0

0.0

Figure 5
Next Gen Tool Usage by Statute (Rulemaking)
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Table 4
Next Gen Tool Usage by Statute (Rulemaking)
Advanced

Innovative

E-Report

Transparency

Built-In

CAA

45.5

22.7

36.4

36.4

72.7

CWA

0.0

18.3

33.3

83.3

16.7

RCRA

0.0

16.7

40.0

60.0

60.0

Finding 5. The Degree of Consistency Among EPA’s Regions. To test possible
variation among EPA’s ten Regions in the use of legal mechanisms, we coded for particular
Regional involvement in individual settlements and permits.68 As Figure 6 shows, EPA
Regions’ use of enforcement settlements to advance Next Gen tools has varied, with Regions 2
and 6 having completed more settlements that include Next Gen tools than the others.69
Headquarters involvement in such settlements has been relatively significant as well.
Figure 6
Next Gen Enforcement Settlements by Region (Through January 31, 2017)

68

We coded for possible regional variations in implementation of Next Gen because the literature suggests strongly
that such variations might be expected. See infra Part III.
69
Because of the limited extent of regional participation in Next Gen, we have not burrowed more deeply into the
numbers to explore the possible significance of the differences that exist. Information about regional consistency (or
lack thereof) in terms of the questions we ask above (statutes involved, tools involved) and below (type of regulated
party involved, inclusion of a SEP project) would be worth exploring as Regions do more. Similarly, it would be
worthwhile to contextualize the information by situating it in terms of regional enforcement and permitting activity
more generally.
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A significant difference also exists in regional use of permitting to advance Next Gen
tools. Only a few EPA regions have included Next Gen tools in permits (EPA Regions 1, 6, and
10), as Table 5 shows. Thus, based on information supplied by EPA, its efforts to use permitting
to implement Next Gen appears to vary significantly among EPA Regions.70
Table 5
Regional Use of Next Gen Tools in Settlements and Permits
Settlement

Permit

Region 1

8

4

Region 2

11

0

Region 3

7

0

Region 4

6

0

Region 5

5

0

Region 6

12

2

Region 7

7

0

Region 8

4

0

Region 9

7

0

Region 10

7

3

Multi-Region

13

3

Total

87

1271

70

See infra note 147 and accompanying text (noting disparities in Regional performance in many areas). Multiregional settlements are national cases that involve a company with facilities in more than one EPA region. These
are often, but not always, handled out of EPA Headquarters. See email correspondence between Cynthia Giles and
Dave Markell, Jan. 25, 2019 (on file with authors).
71
Five permits were issued by states rather than the EPA, which reduces the total Next Gen permits in this analysis
from 17 to 12. The analyses that follow include all 87 settlements and 12 permits, for a sample of 99 cases. The
analysis collapses across settlements and permits. It therefore analyzes them together.
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We further evaluated regional variation to assess whether the regions that are using
enforcement and/or permitting to advance Next Gen are doing so in similar ways. We found a
significant interactive effect between region and likelihood of specific tool usage.72 For example,
we found differences between regions in their use of advanced monitoring and e-reporting.73
Our statistical power was too weak to further unpack these differences, but we provide an
illustrative graph (Figure 7) and chart (Table 6) below.74 Again, even these limited results
support our hypothesis that factors beyond the traditional explanations for mechanism choice
may well contribute to inter-regional differences in the use of different tools.
Figure 7
Regional Differences in the Use of Next Gen Tools
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Table 6
Regional Differences in the Use of Next Gen Tools (Settlements and Permits)75

72

Wald (25, N = 495) = 361.92, p < .001 (interaction effect between mechanism choice and Next Gen tool).
Wald (1, N = 99) = 2431.38, p < .001(simple effect of region on the advanced monitoring tool); Wald (1, 99) =
1393.07, p < .001 (simple effect of region on the e-reporting tool).
74
Region 10 might be more likely to use advanced monitoring and e-reporting compared to the other Regions. It is
also worth noting that no innovative enforcement mechanisms exist in our database of Next Gen permits, and all
compliance built-in mechanisms occurred for permits with EPA Headquarters involvement. Further, the percentages
in the graph and table that follows do not always add up to 100 percent because state instruments have been omitted.
75
The figures in this table represent the percentage of Next Gen items in each region that included the specific Next
Gen tool. For example, 58.3% of all Next Gen items in Region 1 included the advanced monitoring tool.
73
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Advanced

Innovative

E-Report

Transparency

Built-In

Region 1

58.3

08.3

16.7

50.0

16.7

Region 2

81.8

18.2

09.1

72.7

00.0

Region 3

57.1

14.3

00.0

42.9

00.0

Region 4

16.7

16.7

00.0

83.3

00.0

Region 5

100.0

00.0

00.0

20.0

20.0

Region 6

85.7

07.1

14.3

42.9

07.1

Region 7

42.9

42.9

00.0

57.1

00.0

Region 8

100.0

25.0

00.0

25.0

25.0

Region 9

42.9

00.0

14.3

42.9

14.3

Region 10

80.0

00.0

40.0

00.0

10.0

Multi-Reg.

50.0

18.8

12.5

37.5

25.0

Average76

64.7

13.1

12.1

39.4

11.1

We coded for possible regional variations in implementation of Next Gen because the
literature suggests strongly that such variations might be expected. For example, a 2006 U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) study concluded that “EPA regions vary substantially
in the actions they take to enforce environmental requirements.”77 The GAO identified three
factors that are likely contributors to these regional variations: (1) philosophical differences
among regional enforcement staff and between headquarters and regional staff, (2) incomplete
and unreliable enforcement data, and (3) staffing planning and allocation issues.78 Another
explanation for headquarters-regional dissonance, offered by Joel Mintz, is that EPA
Headquarters has failed to clarify its expectations for the Regions or to provide coherent
guidance.79 Mintz concluded that, in at least some instances, regional enforcement officials
ignored or failed to follow Headquarters guidance80 One of us has similarly concluded that
76

These averages are weighted according to the sample size for each region.
U.S., Gov’t Accountability Off., Environmental Compliance and Enforcement: EPA’s Efforts to Improve and
Make More Consistent Its Compliance and Enforcement Activities, GAO-06-840T, at I (2006),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/114303.pdf [hereinafter GAO-06-840T]; see also The State of Environmental Law
Enforcement: A Speech Presented at the American Bar Association's 1998 Annual Meeting, 28 ENVTL. L. REP.
10711, 10712 (noting that “there is some difference in [enforcement] emphasis between different EPA Regions”).
78
GAO-06-840T, supra note 77, at i; cf. id. at 7 (noting that “the considerable autonomy built into EPA’s
decentralized, multilevel organizational structure allows regional offices considerable latitude in adapting
headquarters’ direction in a way they believe best suits their jurisdiction.”). Other GAO reports have reached
similar conclusions. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Major Management Challenges, GAO-11-422T, at
3 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125556.pdf (characterizing the performance of EPA’s regional offices in
carrying out their state oversight responsibilities as “generally proven to be inconsistent over the years”).
79
JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA 105-10 (1995) [hereinafter MINTZ 1995]; id.at 116 (discussing the
need for more direct regional accountability on enforcement matters and differences in the degree of accountability
between Regions).
80
Id. at 75-76; cf. Alfred R. Light, Deja Vu All over Again? A Memoir of Superfund Past, 10-Fall NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T 29, 33 (1995) (“Though EPA has published policy guidance [under CERCLA] for its regions for many of
these settlement tools, many are rarely used,”).
77
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“there appears to be fairly widespread disregard by EPA Regions . . . of EPA [headquarters’]
enforcement policies,”81 probably due in part to the non-binding nature of the relevant guidance
and policies.82 These challenges83 have periodically led to calls for less regional flexibility and
more prescriptive direction from Headquarters.84
Finding 6. The Role of Regulated Parties in Mechanism Choice. A sixth set of
findings relates to a different set of critical actors: regulated parties.85 We coded the
enforcement settlements to evaluate whether EPA’s use of its legal mechanisms varies depending
on the identity of the settling party (industrial vs. municipal party), and did the same with respect
to the identity of the permittee in the permits that include Next Gen tools. Information about the
identity of the regulated party is readily accessible in the EPA Next Gen compilations. As a
result, it was feasible to undertake this effort to bring a nuanced lens to EPA mechanism choice
and use through this binary unpacking of the regulated community.
Figure 8 shows that the identity of the regulated party is associated with the use of
enforcement and permitting in different ways. For the period we studied, EPA used its
mechanisms differently depending on whether the regulated party was an industrial party or a
municipality.86 In particular, Next Gen settlements were significantly more likely to contain an
industrial defendant than a municipal defendant.87 The opposite was true with respect to Next
Gen permits, although the difference did not rise to statistical significance.88
Figure 8
Use of Next Gen Mechanisms as a Function of the Defendant’s Identity

81

David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a 'Reinvented' State/Federal Relationship: The
Divide between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.1, 7, 54 n. 223 (2000).
82
See Ellen R. Zahren, Comment, Overfiling Under Federalism: Federal Nipping at State Heels to Protect the
Environment, 49 EMORY L.J. 373, 383 (2000) (referring to guidance to regional administrators and states).
83
For general discussion of the “promise and limitations of regional administrative governance” and a plea for more
research on federal decentralization and regional governance, see Dave Owen, Regional Administration, 63 UCLA
L. REV. 58 (2016).
84
See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, More Consistency Needed Among EPA Regions in Approach To
Enforcement, RCED-00-108, at 11-12 (2000), www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00108.pdf (concluding that guidance on
key elements of audit protocols would “engender a higher level of consistency among all [ten] regional offices”).
85
See infra Part III (discussing why, based on past analysis, we believed there might be differences in mechanism
choice based on the identity of the regulated party).
86
Wald (1, N = 104) = 6.98, p = .008 (interaction between mechanism choice and the defendant’s identity). We
examined this interaction by looking at the effect of the defendant’s identity in settlements and in permits separately.
87
Chi-square (1, N = 87) = 14.08, p < .001.
88
Chi-square (1, N = 17) = 1.47, p = .225.
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Table 7
Use of Next Gen Mechanisms as a Function of the Defendant’s Identity
Industrial Defendant

Municipal Defendant

Settlements

70.1

29.9

Permits

35.3

64.7

Moreover, the defendant’s identity affected the specific tools that EPA used to enforce
Next Gen, and it did so differently depending on whether EPA used its enforcement mechanism
or its permitting mechanism. 89 For example, settlements with municipalities include
transparency more than any other tool,90 while permits with municipalities include advanced
monitoring more than any other tool.91 Settlements with industrial parties include advanced
monitoring more than any other tool,92 while permits with industrial parties included
transparency more than any other tool in our sample, although this did not reach statistical
significance.93
Figure 9
Likelihood of Tool Usage by Type of Defendant (Settlements and Permits)

Wald (9, N = 520) = 286.77, p < .001 (interaction among the defendant’s identity, mechanism choice, and Next
Gen tool).
90
Wald (3, N = 130) = 326.87, p < .001 (main effect of tool usage).
91
Wald (2, N = 55) = 180.10, p < .001 (main effect of tool usage).
92
Wald (4, N = 305) = 54.74, p < .001 (main effect of tool usage).
93
Wald (3, N = 30) = 1.08, p = .781.
89
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Table 8
Likelihood of Tool Usage by Type of Defendant (Settlements and Permits)
Advanced

Innovative

E-Report

Transparency

Built-In

Industrial

48.3

13.5

3.4

23.6

11.2

Municipal

42.9

2.9

5.7

48.6

0.0

Industrial

25.0

0.0

25.0

37.5

12.5

Municipal

44.4

0.0

27.8

27.8

0.0

Settlements

Permits

We investigated possible differences in use of mechanisms to advance Next Gen
objectives based on the identity of the affected regulated part(ies) because a literature exists that
suggests that, in at least some circumstances, EPA has, on occasion, treated municipal and
industrial parties differently.94 For example, one scholar reported that, during the 1990s, EPA
had a “prosecutorial habit of naming private, but not municipal,” entities as potentially

94

See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Enforcement & Compliance Monitoring, Guidance on Bringing
Enforcement Actions Against POTWs for Failure to Implement Pretreatment Programs (Aug. 4, 1988),
https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0189.pdf (stating that EPA placed a high priority on assuring local
pretreatment program implementation through enforcement against municipalities); Clifford Rechtschaffen,
Deterrence v. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1227,
1231 (1998) (finding that the great majority of municipal facilities violated the CWA without targeted enforcement);
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE & POLICY 932 (2d ed. 1996) (noting
that EPA officials acknowledge they virtually never obtain economic benefits when they file enforcement actions
against municipal sewage treatment facilities)
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responsible parties in CERCLA enforcement actions.95 During that time, this “habit” “shift[ed]
billions of dollars of cleanup responsibilities . . . [from] municipalities and impos[ed] their
cleanup share on private parties.”96 Similarly, in describing a major municipal compliance
initiative aimed at assisting municipalities with meeting CWA treatment requirements, EPA
noted that it would prioritize enforcement actions against industrial violators.97
While the qualifications we discuss in Part III highlight the importance of more thorough
work to understand why EPA has used its mechanisms differently with respect to industrial and
municipal regulated parties, our findings suggest that the identity of the regulated party may
influence how EPA chooses and uses available legal mechanisms.
Our final two sets of findings (Findings 7 and 8) explore two issues that are unique to use
of the enforcement mechanism. We call these intra-mechanism nuances. Finding 7 explores
EPA’s use of administrative versus judicial enforcement. Finding 8 considers EPA’s inclusion in
an enforcement settlement of a Supplemental Environmental Project (SEP) and the impacts on
mechanism choice and use.
Finding 7. Intra-Mechanism Nuance # 1: Administrative vs. Judicial Enforcement
Settlements. EPA has a choice of pursuing alleged violators on its own through administrative
enforcement or by collaborating with DOJ to pursue judicial enforcement.98 We investigated
EPA’s use of each of these types of enforcement mechanisms and have three findings to report.
a. Intra-Mechanism Nuance # 1: The Impact of Administrative vs. Judicial Enforcement
Settlements on Mechanism Choice.
Of the 87 settlements we identified that include at least one Next Gen tool, EPA
negotiated 31 on its own administratively (35.6%). For the remaining 56 (64.3%), the agency
worked with DOJ to negotiate a settlement. This breakdown of administrative vs. judicial
settlements that include Next Gen tools is very different from the overall distribution of EPA
95

Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 197, 252-253 (1988).
96
Id. at 274. Ferrey attributed EPA’s likely rationale for differential treatment of industrial and municipal liable
parties to concern that municipal liability would “translate directly into higher property tax levies. As a result,
current property taxpayers would indemnify PRP municipalities for past [environmental violations], raising
intergenerational equity issues. In some situations, this burden on the municipal fisc would spill over into requests
for state assistance.” Id.
97
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Municipal Policy and Strategy for Construction Grants, NPDES Permits, and
Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act, at 5 (1979),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P1005D0R.PDF?Dockey=P1005D0R.pdf; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Policy
Guidance for FY 1980/1981, at 35 (1979),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/2000RWOH.PDF?Dockey=2000RWOH.pdf.
98
See, e.g., Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies’ Programs,
52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1367-68 (2000) (“The EPA thus has two quite independent enforcement regimes operating
simultaneously.”). Sanctions vary as well. Compare 33 U.S.C.§ 1319(g)(6) (2012) (administrative penalties) with
id. 1319(d) (civil judicial penalties). EPA has multiple options administratively that run from the relatively
informal, such as warning letters, to issuance of formal complaints seeking penalties and injunctive relief. See, e.g.,
id. § 1319(g). The contrast we consider in our case study is between administrative adjudication and civil judicial
adjudication.
98
See e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2011)
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settlements. Over the same time period (January 1, 2014 - January 31, 2017), EPA settled the
vast majority of enforcement cases administratively—7,433 administrative settlements vs. 421
judicial settlements. 99 Thus, including a Next Gen tool in a settlement was associated with what
we term intra-mechanism choice – EPA’s use of administrative or judicial enforcement to
resolve alleged violations.
b. Intra-Mechanism Nuance # 1: The Impact of Administrative vs. Judicial Enforcement
Settlements on Tool Usage.
We assessed whether EPA’s use of an administrative or a judicial settlement is associated
with Next Gen tool use and detected a non-significant overall effect.100 Nonetheless, planned
comparison testing revealed a statistically significant difference in the likelihood of the use of the
transparency tool; specifically, it was much more likely to be included in settlements when the
agency worked with DOJ than when EPA negotiated the settlement on its own.101 A similar
difference was trending with respect to innovative enforcement, although it was not statistically
significant.
Figure 10
Next Gen Tool Usage as a Function of the Type of Proceeding102

70

Presence (%)

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Advanced

Innovative

E-Report

Administrative

Transparent

Built-In

Judicial

99

https://echo.epa.gov/facilities/enforcement-case-search/. We ran the following search to determine the total
number of administrative and judicial settlements during January 1, 2014-January 31, 2017. Case Type: Civil;
Case Category: Any; Case Lead: Federal EPA; Date Range: 1/1/2014-1/31/2017 (final order issued). The Next
Gen cases add up to 57 because 30 cases were removed from pre-2014 so the time frame would be comparable to
the total number of EPA cases. https://echo.epa.gov/facilities/enforcement-case-search/. Of these 57, 22 cases
were administrative and 35 were judicial. Cf. Joseph J. Lisa, EPA Administrative Enforcement Actions: An
Introduction to the Consolidates Rules of Practice, 24 TEMPLE JOURNAL OF SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. LAW 1, 2
(2005) (noting that EPA is “substantially more likely to address violations . . . through an administrative
proceeding than a civil action or criminal prosecution in federal court”).
100
Wald (4, N = 435) = 5.34, p = .255.
101
B = 0.74, SE = 0.30, Wald (1, N = 87) = 6.26, p = .012.
102
In the Table accompanying this Figure (and in all tables in this Article), values with different superscripts are
significantly different from one another at the p < .05 level.
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Table 9
Next Gen Tool Usage as a Function of the Type of Proceeding
Administrative

Judicial

Advanced Monitoring

67.7a

66.1a

Innovative Enforcement

9.7b

17.9b

E-Reporting

3.2b

7.1b

Transparency

25.8b

53.6ac

Compliance Built-In

16.1b

8.9b

c. Intra-Mechanism Nuance # 1: The Impact of Administrative vs. Judicial Enforcement
Settlements under Different Statutes
We found that EPA’s use of its administrative and judicial enforcement authorities varies
significantly by statute.103 Specifically, while nearly all settlements under the CWA that include
one or more Next Gen tools occurred with judicial enforcement, settlements under the CAA and
RCRA were equally likely to be administrative or judicial enforcement.104
Figure 11
Type of Next Gen Proceeding as a Function of Statute
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Table 10
Differences in Use of Administrative and Judicial Settlements by Statute
103

Wald (2, N = 72) = 12.30, p = .002 (overall effect). As we noted above, we excluded from our analysis all cases
where we could not classify the governing statute as exclusively either the CAA, the CWA, or RCRA.
104
B = 1.68, SE = 0.50, Wald (1, N = 72) = 11.42, p = .001 (comparison of judicial proceedings under CAA and
CWA); B = 1.79, SE = 0.60, Wald (1, N = 72) = 8.89, p = .003 (comparison of judicial proceedings under RCRA
and CWA).
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Administrative
CAA
CWA
RCRA

a

Judicial
54.3a
96.3c
50.0a

45.7
3.7b
50.0a

Finding 8. Intra-Mechanism Nuance # 2: The Impact of Supplemental
Environmental Projects. A final issue we investigated in our review of EPA settlements that
include Next Gen tools involves the impact of EPA’s incorporation of a unique enforcement
settlement technique known as a “supplemental environmental project.” A SEP is a project that
involves “beyond compliance” behavior that EPA sometimes includes in a settlement. The
government cannot mandate that an alleged violator undertake a SEP project.105 The carrot EPA
offers to a settling party involves reduction in the payable penalty for the alleged infraction.106
Differences in the use of SEPs in settlements that include one or more Next Gen tools represents
a second type of intra-mechanism variation, in addition to distinctions between judicial civil and
administrative enforcement.
a. Intra-Mechanism nuance # 2 (SEPs) – Impacts on Intra-Mechanism Choice
The SEP technique was included in 27 of the 87 settlements in our database (31%). A far
greater percentage of Next Gen settlements include SEP projects than is the case for EPA’s
settlements overall during the same time frame.107
b. Intra-Mechanism nuance # 2 (SEPs) – Impacts on Tools Usage
We found a marginally significant effect in Next Gen tool variation as a function of the
presence of a SEP.108 This marginal effect was driven by advanced monitoring and innovative
enforcement, insofar as we observed advanced monitoring more often in settlements when a SEP
was present, and we observed innovative enforcement less often when a SEP was present. 109

105

U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) Policy: 2015 Update 1,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-04/documents/sepupdatedpolicy15.pdf (“SEPs are projects or
activities that go beyond what could legally be required in order for the defendant to return to compliance.”).
106
Id. at 21.
107
Our calculations indicate that SEPs were included in just 441 of the 9,493 non-Next Gen EPA case conclusions
from 2013 through 2016, which is roughly 4.6%. The difference in proportions of Next Gen settlements that
included a SEP (31%) and non-Next Gen settlements that included a SEP (4.6%) was statistically significant, chisquare (1, N = 9,580) = 129.20, p < .001. Our calculation deserves a word of caution, however, because EPA’s
archival database includes not only enforcement settlements, but enforcement “conclusions,” which we believe may
include completed litigation as well. We note, however, that the disparity between the proportion of Next Gen
settlements that include SEPs and the proportion of non-Next Gen settlements that include SEPs is so vast, that it is
highly likely that the disparity would remain statistically significant even if we could exclude completed litigation
from the analysis.
108
Wald (4, N = 435) = 8.76, p = .067 (interaction effect of the presence of SEP and Next Gen tool).
109
For advanced monitoring, B = 0.64, SE = 0.32, Wald (1, N = 87) = 3.93, p = .048; for innovative enforcement, B
= -0.95, SE = 0.49, Wald (1, N = 87) = 3.79. p = .052.
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Figure 12
Presence of SEP as a Function of Next Gen Tool Usage
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Table 11
Use of Next Gen Tools in Settlements with and without SEPs
SEP
a

Non-SEP

Advanced Monitoring

81.5

60.0b

Innovative Enforcement

3.7d

20.0c

E-Reporting

3.7d

6.7d

Transparency

37.0bc

46.7b

Compliance Built-In

11.1d

11.7d

c. Intra-Mechanism nuance # 3 (SEPs) – Impacts Under Different Statutes
We also found a significant effect of the relevant statute on the likelihood of the
settlement including the SEP technique.110 The overall effect was driven by a significant
decrease in the likelihood of SEP usage under the CWA.111
Figure 13
Inclusion of SEP as a Function of Statute

110

Wald (2, N = 87) = 6.01, p = .049 (overall effect).
B = -0.89, SE = 0.39, Wald (1, N = 87) = 5.36, p = .021 (SEP usage under CWA compared with CAA); B = -.97,
SE = 0.51, Wald (1, N = 87) = 3.56, p = .059 (SEP usage under CWA compared with RCRA).
111
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Table 12
Percentages of SEP Use by Statute
SEP

Non-SEP

CAA

37.1a

62.9ad

CWA

11.1b

88.9d

RCRA

40.0a

60.0a

d. Intra-Mechanism nuance # 2 (SEPs) – The Relationship to Administrative vs. Judicial
Settlements
Finally, we evaluated whether the presence or absence of the SEP feature is related to the
nature of the settlement (an administrative settlement negotiated by the EPA or a judicial
settlement that involved DOJ).112 We found an effect of the mode of enforcement on the
presence or absence of the SEP technique in the settlement.113 Specifically, a SEP was
significantly more likely to be present when the mode of enforcement was administrative (that is,
when EPA negotiated the settlement alone) than when it was negotiated by EPA and DOJ
together.
Figure14
Inclusion of SEP as a Function of the Type of Proceeding

We investigated, but did not find, a statistically meaningful effect of the defendant’s identity on the presence or
absence of a SEP. B = -0.34, SE = 0.32, Wald (1, N = 87) = 1.11, p = .291.
113
B = -0.61, SE = 0.29, Wald (1, N = 87) = 4.38, p = .036.
112
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Table 13
Comparative Use of SEPS in Administrative and Judicial Settlements
SEP

Non-SEP

Administrative

45.2

a

54.8a

Judicial

23.2b

76.8c

Intra-mechanism nuances such as these have received relatively little attention in the
literature on agency mechanism choice. Thus, our findings that there is a relationship between
the type of enforcement mechanism EPA used and several other variables offers a significant
new direction for additional research to explore the reasons for the differences we uncovered.
Several implications for agency mechanism choice follow from these results. The following
section explores those implications.
III. Provisional Assessments Regarding Factors that May Influence Mechanism Choice
The traditional law review literature on mechanism choice focuses considerable attention
on features of the legal mechanisms themselves as factors that might lead an agency to use one
mechanism versus another to advance an objective.114 This Part explores six other factors that
we believe may influence mechanism choices, using the findings in Part II to illustrate the
potential importance of these factors on mechanism choice.115 The discussion elaborates on the
ways in which the factors we identify extend well beyond the traditional literature’s typology of
such factors and sheds light on how this kind of expanded analysis is capable of providing
critical insights into how agencies do and should choose among available legal mechanisms.
114

See, e.g., supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing attributes of rulemaking and adjudication that may
influence how agencies choose among those mechanisms).
115
This list of factors is not intended to be comprehensive.
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A.

The Possible Influence of Key Internal Actors

One of our core hypotheses is that an agency’s choice of legal mechanisms (e.g.,
rulemaking, enforcement, or permitting) to advance an objective may be driven, at least in part,
by the key internal actors involved in making such choices. More specifically, we posit that the
preferences and capacity of one key actor, OECA, may have influenced EPA to use one
mechanism (enforcement) more than others (rulemaking and permitting) in its implementation of
Next Gen. We find a strong association between OECA’s key role in implementing Next Gen
and that initiative’s emphasis on the use of enforcement to pursue its compliance enhancement
and enforcement efficacy goals.
1.

The Influence of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance

OECA’s central role in implementing Next Gen seems clear. OECA was the “policy
entrepreneur” for the development and roll-out of Next Gen.116 Without OECA’s leadership, it is
unlikely that Next Gen would have been rolled out at all; and any rollout would likely have taken
a different form and approach. OECA not only conceived of and sponsored Next Gen; it also
strongly advocated using enforcement to advance Next Gen strategies.117 For example, in a 2015
memorandum in which she affirmed the prominent role she anticipated for EPA Headquarters in
implementing Next Gen, OECA head Cynthia Giles indicated OECA’s intent to integrate Next
Gen approaches pervasively into its enforcement caseload, rather than confine them to an
ancillary feature of compliance promotion efforts. She directed EPA to consider “Next Gen
compliance tools” in all cases,118 and to include them “whenever appropriate in civil judicial and
administrative settlements.”119 Another example of OECA’s commitment to promoting Next
116

See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Next Generation Compliance and Permitting (June 11, 2015) (on file with the authors)
(noting that Next Generation Compliance is “led by [OECA]”); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NEXT
GENERATION COMPLIANCE: STRATEGIC PLAN 2014-2017, at 2 (2014),
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/next-gen-compliance-strategic-plan-2014-2017.pdf
[hereinafter NEXT GEN STRATEGIC PLAN] (noting that OECA has the lead for many Next Gen ideas and that it is
“working across the agency to help assure coordinated implementation”).
117
EPA listed as a key element of Next Gen “[d]evelop[ing] and us[ing] innovative enforcement approaches to
achieve more widespread compliance.” Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, FY
2016-2017 National Program Manager Guidance 13-15 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201502/documents/oecas_draft_fy_2016-2017_national_program_manager_guidance_february_19_2.pdf [hereinafter
2016-2017 OECA Guidance]; see also id. at 7 (discussing “greater use of fenceline monitoring and publication of
pollution information, . . . advanced monitoring and electronic reporting in our enforcement investigations and
settlements, . . . and self and third party certification tools, to help drive better compliance”).
118
Memorandum from Cynthia Giles to Regional Counsels, etc., Use of Next Generation Compliance Tools in Civil
Enforcement Settlements 1, 6 (Jan. 7, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Giles Memorandum],
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-01/documents/memo-nextgen-useinenfsettlements.pdf.
119
2015 Giles Memorandum, supra note 118, at 1. The Memorandum lists four Next Gen compliance tools in
particular: advanced monitoring; independent third-party verification of a settling party’s compliance with
settlement obligations (a variant of “innovative enforcement,” the fifth key element in Next Gen); electronic
reporting; and public accountability through increased transparency of compliance data. Giles explained that these
tools, which involve “use of modern information technology,” would create an “effective structure for the settling
party to comply with settlement requirements without increasing EPA’s oversight burden.” Id. See also Renee
Schoof, Air Toxics, Hazardous Waste Top EPA Enforcement Priorities, 47 ENV’T REP. (BNA) S-62 (Jan. 15, 2016)
(reporting Giles’ statement that EPA would increase would use of advanced monitoring). Giles later issued another
memorandum encouraging the use of Next Gen tools in SEPs. Memorandum from Cynthia Giles to Regional
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Gen through enforcement was its development of a Strategic Plan to integrate Next Gen into the
agency’s compliance and enforcement program.120 OECA afforded less emphasis to rulemaking
or permitting as a Next Gen implementation mechanism.121
The results of our empirical evaluation of Next Gen’s implementation bear out these
qualitative examples of OECA’s emphasis on enforcement as the principal mechanism for that
initiative. Finding 1 shows that EPA used enforcement far more than rulemaking or permitting
to advance Next Gen.122 This emphasis on the enforcement mechanism may have several
explanations. For example, OECA has relatively greater influence over EPA’s enforcement
agenda than over either rulemaking or permitting, which are conducted by other offices within
EPA (or, in the case of permitting, by the states).123 For this reason, rulemaking and enforcement
pose greater coordination challenges, both horizontal and vertical, for the agency than reliance
on enforcement to promote Next Gen.
EPA’s institutional structure is complex, as is the case for many federal agencies. Its
national Headquarters includes several offices, including the Office of the Administrator, several
“program” offices that focus on specific EPA regulatory programs intended to protect different
parts of the environment (e.g., the Office of Air and Radiation and the Office of Water), and
various cross-cutting offices, including the general Counsel’s Office and OECA.124
Responsibility for implementing regulatory initiatives is dispersed throughout EPA, with
Administrators, Issuance of the 2015 Update to the 1998 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Supplemental
Environmental Projects Policy 1 (March 10, 2015), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201504/documents/sepupdatedpolicy15.pdf (noting that SEPs “are an important component of EPA’s enforcement
program”). In 2018, however, Giles’ successor withdrew the 2015 Giles Memorandum, stating that:
there is no default expectation that “innovative enforcement” provisions will routinely be sought as
injunctive relief, where such activities are not required by the applicable statute or regulation. The
determination to include these particular elements of injunctive relief (as with any other element of
injunctive relief) is to be based on the particular facts and needs in a case.
Susan Parker Bodine, The Appropriate Use of Compliance Tools in Civil Enforcement Settlements (April 3, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201804/documents/memoonappropriateuseofcompliancetoolsincivilenforcementsettlements.pdf.
120
NEXT GEN STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 116, at 3-7.
121
See also infra notes 122, 129 and accompanying text. We do not want to overstate the point. OECA also
promoted the use of these other mechanisms to advance Next Gen goals. See, e.g., NEXT GEN STRATEGIC PLAN,
supra note 116, at 3 (discussing more effective regulations and permits).
122
See supra § II B.1.
123
OECA’s role is to “serve as the primary adviser to the Administrator in matters concerning enforcement,
compliance assurance, and environmental-equity efforts. It also provides the direction and review of all
administrative, civil and criminal enforcement, and compliance monitoring and assurance activities.” U.S.
Government Manual, Environmental Protection Agency,
https://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov/Agency.aspx?EntityId=nd3GrN5/DeY=&ParentEId=+klubNxgV0o=&ETyp
e=jY3M4CTKVHY. OECA explains that it “goes after pollution problems . . . through vigorous civil and criminal
enforcement. . . ,” and that it “works with EPA regional offices, and in partnership with state and tribal governments
. . . to enforce the nation’s environmental laws.” About the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance
(OECA): What We Do, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/about-office-enforcement-and-compliance-assurance-oeca.
124
See EPA Organization Chart, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-organization-chart. For discussion of the
history of the development of EPA’s structure, see Alfred A. Marcus, EPA’s Organizational Structure, 54-Aut. L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991). EPA has changed its structure periodically. See, e.g., David Markell, “Slack” in the
Administrative State and Its Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 52 (2005).
The current administration has contemplated further organizational changes. See, e.g., OMB Reviewing Pruitt’s
Plan to Replace EPA Regions with State Offices, InsideEPA.com (Dec. 15, 2017).
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program offices having significant roles in the rulemaking realm in particular.125 Responsibility
for permitting often radiates to regulators entirely outside Washington, as it is split between EPA
regional offices and the states.
OECA may have pushed less hard to include Next Gen approaches in rulemaking or
permitting than in enforcement settlements because of its relative lack of control over the use of
the former two mechanisms, whose use is determined by other environmental regulatory entities.
The program offices within EPA’s Headquarters, which are responsible for rule issuance, and the
regional offices and states where permitting activity occurs, thus had greater capacity than
OECA to influence the use of those mechanisms.
Public administration scholars have recognized that “[c]omplex innovations [such as
Next Gen] require laying the social, technical, and intellectual groundwork acceptable to a wider
spectrum of organizational units and members.”126 The diffusion of responsibility, and capacity,
within EPA supports the suggestion of public administration scholars that successful
implementation of Next Gen and similar initiatives requires significant groundwork to attract
buy-in from an array of actors whose support and participation are indispensable but not
guaranteed. Champions of initiatives such as Next Gen are likely to need the cooperation and
support of other key headquarters actors for the use of particular mechanisms. As a result,
mechanism choice and use may well depend in part on the relative buy-in, preferences, and
capacity of different offices.127 It may have been more difficult for OECA to convince those
responsible for issuing rules and permits to prioritize Next Gen and incorporate its tools into
their actions than to infuse its own enforcement actions with Next Gen features.
Finally, EPA’s policy offices, its regional offices, and state permitting officials may have
felt less ownership over Next Gen, and a lesser degree of commitment to using their authorities
to promote it, than OECA. OECA would likely have garnered the lion’s share of plaudits for
Next Gen’s success, even if the efforts of others were critical to that success. One former OECA
official told us that no one in the EPA program offices opposed Next Gen, but it was a matter of
125

See Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54-Aut. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70
(1991) (stating that most EPA rules originate in the national program offices). EPA’s Headquarters participates in
permitting and enforcement, and the Regions participate in rulemaking, so the text oversimplifies distribution of
responsibility for use of these mechanisms.
126
Fariborz Damanpour & Marguerite Schneider, Characteristics of Innovation and Innovation Adoption in Public
Organizations: Assessing the Role of Managers, 19 J. OF PUB. ADM’N RESEARCH & THEORY 495, 503 (2008); see
also Sergio Fernandez & Hal G. Rainey, Managing Successful Organizational Change in the Public Sector, 66 PUB.
ADM’N REV. 168, 170 (2006) (“Managerial leaders must build internal support for change and reduce resistance to it
through widespread participation in the change process and other means.”); Paul R. Verkuil, VALUING
BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE FOR PROFESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 144 (2017) (noting that, as a result of intentional
fragmentation and overlap of agency authority, “collaboration is often the hardest thing to achieve”); cf. ACUS
Recommendation 2012-5 (June 15, 2012), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/Final-Recommendation-2012-5Improving-Agency-Coordination.pdf (suggesting “reforms aimed at improving coordination of regulatory
policymaking”).
EPA’s David Hindin put it more simply: “Any time you ask people to change you’re going to get some resistance
to change. That’s normal. We expect it.” EPA Official: ‘Next Generation Improving Compliance, 47 ENV’T REP.
(BNA) 1742 (2016).
127
See Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 422 (2015) (“Organizational design
choices can determine who controls the levers of influence . . . within an administrative agency.”) [hereinafter Nou,
Coordination].
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relative priority. Next Gen was a high priority for the Associate Administrator for OECA, but
not as high a priority for officials in other programs that focus on permitting and rulemaking.128
Moreover, EPA developed neither specific plans to use permitting or rulemaking to advance
Next Gen, nor specific metrics for evaluating the performance of the programs.129 Another
OECA official explained that “the main reason there are no specific deliverables to include Next
Gen features in permits in [agency guidance documents] is that we are in OECA and the permits
are issued under the programs (air, water, waste).”130 The absence of overarching directives or
oversight mechanisms may have weakened the incentives of governmental actors outside OECA
to include Next Gen components in their rules or permits.131
Assuming that horizontal and vertical coordination challenges face EPA in its efforts to
integrate novel initiatives such as Next Gen into activities (rulemaking, permitting, and state
enforcement) not directly within OECA’s control, EPA’s history, including past initiatives of
EPA’s enforcement office, demonstrates that overcoming these challenges may not have been
easy. EPA’s compliance and enforcement officials and their counterparts in other offices, such
as the programmatic offices, have not always seen eye to eye, which could have hampered the
use of Next Gen tools in rulemaking. As we have previously noted, some past EPA
enforcement-related initiatives encountered significant pushback from other agency headquarters
offices.132 EPA’s structure and past experience, in short, reflect that barriers to effective policy
design and implementation resulting from internal substantive disagreements, capacity
shortcomings, or coordination challenges may influence EPA’s mechanism choices.133 Rather
than push recalcitrant offices responsible for rulemaking and permitting to pursue Next Gen
strategies, OECA may have decided to rely on enforcement as the principal mechanism for
implementing that initiative. Even if OECA tried to induce those offices to foster Next Gen,
their refusal or laggardly efforts to do so may have had the same results.
2.

Horizontal Coordination Challenges

One former EPA enforcement official, Bernadette Rappold, stated that “[i]t’s not always clear to me how much
the rank and file are committed to” Next Gen principles. Former EPA Officials See Uncertain Future for ‘Next
Generation’ Compliance, InsideEPA.com (Oct. 26, 2016) (also noting that a former Assistant Administrator for
OECA characterized Next Gen’s future within the agency as “uncertain . . . because it is unclear whether a future
EPA enforcement chief would support it”).
129
Despite EPA’s active rulemaking docket, and its seeming commitment to use rules to advance Next Gen, an
OECA guidance document for 2016-17 did not list any regulations it planned to develop to advance Next Gen’s
objective of “[d]esign[ing] more effective regulations. . . , with a goal of improved compliance and environmental
outcomes.” 2016-2017 OECA Guidance, supra note 117, at 13.
130
Catherine Tunis e-mail to Katrina M. Miller (Sept. 12, 2016). OECA served as the lead office for developing the
NPDES e-reporting rule, which is unusual.
131
Cf. Christopher Carmichael, Managing the Risk of Incentive Compensation at Financial Institutions, 36 BANKING
& FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., January 2017, at 3, 5 (stating that “goals and evaluation metrics . . . have an impact on
employee behavior”).
132
See Unraveling, supra note 1, at 353-54; supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. The problem is
longstanding. See, e.g., Frederick R. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund,
1985 DUKE L.J. 261, 380 (1985) (“Program and enforcement are in an uneasy equilibrium at headquarters.”).
133
See, e.g., Holistic, supra note 19, at 34 (referring to “horizontal coordination challenges . . . within, between, and
among agencies”); see generally Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012).
128
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EPA is not oblivious to these coordination challenges. For example, it sought to address
horizontal coordination obstacles by establishing a “default assumption” that one of OECA’s
Next Gen tools, e-reporting, would be required in new regulations.134 One OECA official
informed us that it conducted training on how to write effective rules using Next Gen principles
and tools.135 OECA also worked with other EPA offices to promote aspects of Next Gen through
greater reliance on advanced monitoring.136
Yet another horizontal coordination challenge relates to the relationship between EPA
and DOJ. One might not spend much time considering the possible impact of DOJ involvement
if DOJ typically served as a rubber stamp for EPA decisions. But that is clearly not the case.
DOJ takes seriously its independent role as the lawyers for the United States in judicial litigation,
and feels free to develop its own positions.137 Thus, potential differences in priority and strategy
between internal agency personnel and DOJ attorneys have the potential to slow, divert, or defeat
agency enforcement initiatives. Full-throttled DOJ support, on the other hand, has the potential
to promote them.138 For purposes of our case study, the key question is whether DOJ’s
involvement may affect whether and how EPA uses enforcement as a mechanism.
Because DOJ supervises judicial enforcement litigation on environmental matters, its
buy-in (or the lack thereof) is likely to influence whether Next Gen features find their way into
judicial dispositions of court-approved settlements. We found that more than 60 percent of the
enforcement settlements that contained Next Gen features were negotiated through a judicial
consent decree with DOJ involvement.139 Thus, DOJ played a significant role in the use of
enforcement to implement Next Gen. In contrast, DOJ’s involvement in settlements more
generally is far more limited. For example, the vast majority of EPA settlements during the same
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136
Id.; see also 2016-2017 OECA Guidance, supra note 117, at 15 (instructing EPA Regions to “[i]nclude Next
Generation Compliance principles, tools, and approaches when issuing permits, reviewing permits, and training
permit writers”).
137
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See Marc Melnick & Elizabeth Willes, Watching the Candy Store: EPA Overfiling of Local Air Pollution
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Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1454 (2014); Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman,
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time period were resolved administratively.140 One explanation for the relatively high rate of
DOJ participation in Next Gen settlements might be the additional seriousness of litigation if it is
being pursued judicially rather than administratively. Pursuing a case in court might give EPA
additional leverage to procure a settlement, and the agency may have believed that such leverage
would be helpful. The difference in maximum penalty amounts is a prominent example.141 In
addition, the types of cases most suitable for judicial settlement may also be most suitable for
Next Gen. EPA may have decided that the circumstances in which Next Gen tools are most
needed should be pursued in court not only because of the higher penalties available, but also
because judicial settlements may attract more publicity than administrative settlements, creating
a more effective general deterrent.142
Notwithstanding the higher percentage of settlements with Next Gen features that
resulted from judicial proceedings, at least according to one source, “DOJ has never adopted the
Next Generation model as an authoritative guide on how to conduct prosecutions, instead
considering its principles as one set of factors among many that play into any case.”143
Accordingly, EPA and DOJ may diverge on the extent to which they prioritize the Next Gen
initiative generally, or particular Next Gen tools. This appears to be at least a possibility. For
example, Finding 7, which relates to intra-mechanism choices involving enforcement, explores
the extent to which DOJ’s involvement in enforcement settlements affected the mix of Next Gen
tools incorporated into those settlements. We found, for example, that the transparency tool was
more likely to be incorporated into a settlement involving DOJ than in an administrative
settlement negotiated by EPA alone. This large disparity was missing for the other Next Gen
tools, and for two (advanced monitoring and compliance built in), administrative settlements
were more likely to include them than judicial settlements. These disparate results may be due to
differences in the two agencies’ views over the likely effectiveness or legality of the various
Next Gen tools.144
Our point here is not to provide a comprehensive set of explanations for the impacts of
DOJ participation on Next Gen settlements. Rather, we believe that the value of our findings is
to highlight the potential significance of horizontal coordination challenges between federal
agencies on mechanism choice and to urge further research into how different pieces of the
administrative state may influence how agencies make those choices.
3.

Vertical Coordination Challenges

Successful integration of Next Gen components into the enforcement and compliance
promotion efforts of EPA and its state partners also depended on vertical coordination. The
allocation of authority between national and more dispersed offices of an agency also may have a
140
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significant impact on mechanism choice, as the role of EPA regional officials demonstrates.145
EPA operates ten regional offices, from Boston (Region 1) to Seattle (Region 10).146 These
offices have primary responsibility for negotiating many enforcement settlements and for issuing
many permits, with varying degrees of Headquarters guidance and oversight.147 Regional offices
may have a more significant influence on mechanism choice than one might expect because of
regional autonomy, lack of coordination, and related factors.148 They may have different
mechanism choice preferences than the agency’s Washington offices or than Next Gen’s
principal entrepreneur, OECA. The critical point here is that, far from marching in lockstep,
EPA Regions often march to their own drummers to a considerable degree, despite Headquarters
efforts to promote national consistency. Finding 5 reflects the influence that the division of
authority between EPA Headquarters and its regional offices may have on mechanism choice.
Thus, regional buy-in (which strong support from an agency’s national office may
engender) is essential to effective implementation of initiatives, such as Next Gen, that an agency
seeks to implement through multiple legal mechanisms, some of which are administered
primarily outside its national offices. Broad-based regional integration is especially important if
an important agency goal is to maintain a level playing field throughout the country, as it is with
EPA.149 These vertical coordination challenges may hold considerable explanatory value for our
findings of regional differences in Next Gen’s development and implementation. Regional
variation was too weak in our findings, however, to provide the basis for strong findings about
the impact that particular Regions may have had in determining Next Gen mechanism choices.
Further research could help determine the extent to which mechanism choice is affected by
regional office actions and decisions generally, and whether particular EPA Regions prefer
particular Next Gen tools in particular. If so, such variations would suggest the importance of
close attention to key actors as possible influences on mechanism choice in a variety of other
settings.150
Although this analysis provides insights into the possible explanations for the
predominance of enforcement settlements as a mechanism for implementing Next Gen, we
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hesitate to draw too many inferences from the data reflected in Finding 1. As indicated above,151
we have little data about the extent to which Next Gen features were built into permits issued by
EPA Regions or the states during the period of our study. These data limitations hinder our
ability to understand whether the relative paucity of the use of permitting as a vehicle for
advancing Next Gen goals is due to factors such as lack of opportunity on the part of OECA, a
conclusion by OECA officials that enforcement settlements would be more effective at achieving
Next Gen goals, or a lack of understanding of or incentive to promote Next Gen by permit
issuers. It would therefore be worthwhile to develop additional information (beyond the data in
Finding 1) to learn more about the possible impact of vertical coordination challenges such as
those facing EPA on mechanism choice.152 More work is needed to unpack the relationship (if
any) between OECA’s motivation and capacity and the actual use of different mechanisms.
In short, we assume that traditional explanations for mechanism choice may have
influenced EPA’s choice of mechanisms to advance Next Gen. But our findings suggest that
other variables we identify as salient for agency mechanism choice, including the mix of actors
charged with implementing a regulatory regime, may also have played a role. In particular, some
combination of OECA’s role as the policy entrepreneur in designing and implementing Next
Gen, its greater control and influence over enforcement than over permitting and rulemaking,
and horizontal and vertical coordination issues, all may have influenced EPA’s mechanism
choice by contributing to its use of enforcement to a greater extent than one might expect based
solely on the conventional typologies of factors that the literature identifies as critical to agency
mechanism choice.153
If this hypothesis is correct, it casts doubt about the comprehensiveness of traditional
explanations for mechanism choice and, instead, suggests that a more expansive lens such as the
one we provide here is needed to understand why agencies choose the mechanisms they do.154
Our findings suggest many opportunities for more in-depth research into several questions
relating to the impact of OECA’s key role and associated horizontal and vertical coordination
challenges on Next Gen’s development and implementation. These include: (1) the extent to
which one or more of the six factors we identify may have influenced the total number of Next
Gen instruments; (2) whether these factors have influenced the relative use of the different types
of instruments; and (3) the extent to which one or more of these factors may have influenced
how such mechanisms were used. Greater insights concerning these issues may help to equip
policymakers to devise strategies that will help to improve internal operations to ameliorate
performance shortcomings and increase the chances of achieving programmatic goals. For our
purposes, the key point is that the facts we have adduced, and additional information of the types
we have identified, all suggest that mechanism choice may well be influenced by more than the
factors highlighted in the traditional law review literature.
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B.

The Possible Influence of Agency Policy Objectives

A second influence on mechanism choice that extends beyond the traditional focus on the
characteristics of the mechanisms themselves is the relationship between an agency’s policy
goals and its choice of strategies to achieve them. EPA has identified five objectives (or tools) in
its Next Gen initiative that it hopes will improve compliance with the environmental laws.155
These include the use of advanced monitoring technologies such as fenceline monitoring; new
information distribution technology such as e-reporting; enhanced transparency measures such as
public notification via agency or regulated party-hosted websites; improved rules that facilitate
compliance (rules with “compliance built in”); and innovative enforcement approaches such as
third-party monitoring. If EPA used a different mix of legal mechanisms to promote these
objectives (e.g., using rulemaking to promote electronic reporting but permitting to promote
advanced monitoring), it would support devoting more attention in future research and analysis
of mechanisms choice to the relationship between an agency’s pursuit of policy objectives and
the mechanisms it chooses to achieve them.
We found that EPA’s use of different Next Gen tools indeed varies significantly by
mechanism. As we indicated in our description of Finding 3, we found a statistically significant
interaction between the type of legal mechanisms and the likelihood of specific tool usage.156
For example, EPA was significantly more likely to use advanced monitoring and transparency in
enforcement settlements than any of the other Next Gen tools.157 Advanced monitoring,
transparency, and e-reporting appeared more frequently in permits than innovative enforcement
or “compliance built in.”158 EPA resorted to advanced monitoring and innovative enforcement
less frequently than the other Next Gen tools in regulations.159
What might account for differential use of tools according to the mechanism chosen to
achieve Next Gen’s effort to strengthen the impact of enforcement and bolster compliance rates?
We posit that several factors may be responsible for the differential association between Next
Gen tools and the mechanism chosen to employ them.160 The first is what we might call “fit.”
The notion of fostering “compliance built in” is to create a regulatory regime that avoids the need
for enforcement by facilitating regulated entities’ ability to understand and comply with their
regulatory obligations. It would make little sense to prioritize the use of that tool in enforcement
settlements because by that time, the enforcement process has run its course. The use of this tool
in regulations and permits makes much more sense.
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A second set of factors might be affordability (to regulated entities and the government)
and cost-effectiveness. It may be that the cost-benefit ratio for use of a tool such as advanced
monitoring is likely to differ dramatically, certainly from industry to industry, but even among
firms within a single industry. If so, an agency might decide to rely on that tool selectively in
permits for which the net payoff is likely to be greatest. A related concern is the practicality of
using a particular tool. The technology to use an advanced monitoring technique may be farther
along for one category of plants, or one environmental medium, than for another, and the
capacity of individual regulated entities to use that technique may differ. Those kinds of
differences may suggest pursuing an incremental approach through permits and settlements until
the agency is convinced that a tool has been used sufficiently to justify requiring it on a broader
scale through regulations.
Concerns about the scope of an agency’s authority to pursue a particular goal, or require
the use of a particular tool, also may affect mechanism choice. Sometimes, agencies are
confident in their legal authority to pursue use of a particular tool in a particular context, while in
others they anticipate legal challenges to the use of a tool by regulated entities and others outside
the agency.161 Industry has raised concerns about EPA’s authority to incorporate third-party
verification (as a form of innovative enforcement) and electronic reporting into its regulatory
programs for underground storage tanks.162 To the extent that EPA is concerned about whether it
has the authority to use a particular Next Gen tool, it may prefer to test that authority in the
context of a select group of settlements or permits rather than through the crucible of across-theboard regulations.
Yet another factor is stakeholder interest. Transparency, for example, may have many
positive payoffs from the perspective of the agency and community groups and nongovernmental organizations. But it also might create greater exposure to third-party suits that
concern regulated parties. That possibility may make regulated parties reluctant to agree to
incorporation of a transparency requirement in a negotiated settlement. Regulated entities may
have less leverage to block the use of that tool in a permit. Our findings, however, reflect
relatively frequent use of transparency in both permits and settlements.
We do not seek here to provide definitive explanations of the impact of the constellation
of factors discussed above on our findings concerning EPA’s Next Gen mechanism choices. Our
goal is simply to suggest expanding the traditional analytical lens by investigating the influence
of these and other factors on mechanism choice.
C. The Possible Influence of the Interaction of Statutory Authority and
Mechanism Choice
In our empirical investigation, we sought to use a statutory lens in evaluating EPA’s use
of different legal mechanisms to advance Next Gen tools and objectives. Finding 4 reflects our
conclusion that an interaction exists between the mechanism used and the governing statute.163
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enforcement oversight if regulate entities were free to choose the certifying entity.
162
See Unraveling, supra note 1, at 382.
163
See supra § II B.4.
45

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3351105

In other words, EPA used the available legal mechanisms to advance Next Gen tools differently
under the three regulatory statutes (the CAA, CWA, and RCRA) that provide the legal landscape
for Next Gen’s development and implementation. For example, we found that EPA included
Next Gen tools more frequently in settlements resolving alleged violations of the CAA than in
regulations or, especially, permits.164 EPA used permits much more frequently as a Next Gen
implementation mechanism under the CWA, and it used rules more frequently under RCRA than
it did under the CAA.165 We also considered whether the mix of Next Gen Tools differed under
the three statutes. We again found that it did. For example, EPA used e-reporting in a lower
percentage of CAA settlements than RCRA settlements.166 EPA aimed at achieving “compliance
built in” less frequently in CWA rules than rules promulgated under the CAA or RCRA.167
Each of these two sets of findings supports our hypothesis that multiple factors beyond
traditional explanations – in this case, differences in statutory authority or the manner in which
an agency uses it – have influenced EPA’s mechanism choices and is likely to do so more
generally. An obvious direction for further research to account for the differences identified in
Finding 4 is to pursue the possibility that differences in EPA’s statutory authority under the three
statutes might help to explain why EPA has used the mechanisms so differently.
The most obvious reason why EPA’s use of Next Gen Tools may differ by statute is the
existence of a statutory mandate to use one or more of those tools or a statutory prohibition on
doing so. A rule that EPA adopted in 2016 under the Formaldehyde Standards for Composite
Wood Products Act, enacted in 2010 as an amendment to the Toxic Substances Control Act, 168
requires third-party monitoring.169 In this case, the impetus for imposition of this Next Gen tool
by rule originated with Congress, which directed EPA to issue regulations that included use of a
third-party testing and certification scheme.170 As EPA explained in the preamble to its proposed
rule, the regulatory imposition of a third-party certification requirement is designed “to help
ensure that regulated composite wood products consistently meet the TSCA Title VI
formaldehyde emission standards.”171 Similarly, RCRA imposed a deadline on EPA to issue
regulations establishing an electronic manifest system, a form of electronic reporting, for the
management of hazardous waste.172 EPA issued these e-reporting regulations in 2014,173 and it
has since issued supplemental regulations addressing issues such as the methodology for
computing user fees.174 These statutory mandates may account for the agency’s greater reliance
164
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on rules to implement an initiative such as Next Gen under RCRA than under other statutes
lacking such mandates.175 The CAA also makes specific reference to a Next Gen tool. It
authorizes EPA to “require enhanced monitoring,” and to do so through the promulgation of
rules .176 EPA has issued implementing regulations, requiring states, for example, to submit
enhanced monitoring plans for ozone.177 Similar tool-specific mandates are missing from the
CWA, which is perhaps part of the reason that EPA resorted to rules as a mechanism for
requiring the use of Next Gen tools less frequently under the CWA than under the other two
statutes. Of course, if a statute mandates or prohibits the use of a particular regulatory approach,
the agency lacks the authority to make any choices concerning that approach.
The more common situation may involve situations in which an agency’s organic statute
authorizes but does not require the use of a regulatory approach or tool. An explicit reference to
an approach or tool in that kind of discretionary delegation may make an agency more
comfortable with and likely to use the tool, as it removes concerns about statutory authority that
may otherwise create obstacles to an agency’s use of the tool or at least induce a cautionary
mindset.178 Even if an agency’s organic statute does not refer to the particular form of a tool the
agency wants to employ, its delegation may be couched in broad terms that are reasonably
susceptible to a reading that provides the agency with sufficient authority to require the use of
that tool by regulated entities. Both the CAA and the CWA, for example, authorize EPA to
require regulated entities to submit reports and engage in emissions or discharge monitoring, but
they do not specify the appropriate forms of reporting (such as a e-reporting) or monitoring (such
as advanced monitoring).179 Nor do they specify the legal mechanism EPA must use in
exercising that authority. As a result, this kind of delegation may not tell us much about why
EPA chose to pursue an authorized Next Gen tool through one mechanism instead of another.
EPA’s choice may have turned on factors such as the importance it attributed to using a
particular tool and the agency’s perception of its suitability for its general application. If EPA
believed that third-party certification was a resource-saving oversight technique that was likely
to provide reliable information regardless of context, for example, it might choose to establish
certification programs by rule in a wide variety of contexts.
Restrictions on the agency’s authority might also influence its mechanism choices. The
CWA, among other federal pollution control statutes, prohibits or restricts the disclosure by EPA
of certain kinds of trade secrets and confidential business information. It also imposes criminal
sanctions on officials who violate those restrictions.180 Concern over running afoul of those
restrictions might lead EPA to decide that a prudent approach to employing the transparency tool
is to do so in individualized contexts such as issuance of permits or entry into enforcement
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settlements, rather than by issuance of rules, at least if EPA intends to rely on agency-created
websites. The more specific contextual use may allow EPA to craft transparency requirements
for individual regulated entities that are less likely to prompt the disclosure of protected
information than a generally applicable rule would do.
Finally, the level of penalty assessments available to an agency may impact the degree to
which it resorts to enforcement actions as a vehicle for requiring regulated entities to use Next
Gen tools. EPA may find enforcement to be a more attractive option under a statute with high
statutory maximum penalties, but it may prefer permitting or rules if available penalties are
lower. These kinds of differences exist in the environmental statutes.181
The foregoing discussion illustrates the mix of considerations that may influence why
agencies choose one mechanism rather than another to pursue their goals or implement a
particular kind of regulatory tool. Further research into comparative mechanism choice under
different statutes administered by the same agency is likely to shed more light on this factor.
D.

The Possible Influence of Regulated Entities

Another factor that tends not to be accounted for in the traditional law review literature is
the influence on mechanism choice of the identity of the regulated entity that would be affected
by the obligations an agency is seeking to impose through one or another mechanism. We
investigated possible differences in the use of mechanisms to advance Next Gen objectives based
on the identity of the affected regulated party because it appears that, in at least some
circumstances and on some occasions, EPA has treated municipal and industrial parties
differently.182 For example, one scholar reported that, during the 1990s, EPA had a
“prosecutorial habit of naming private, but not municipal,” entities as potentially responsible
parties in CERCLA enforcement actions.183 During that time, this “habit” “shift[ed] billions of
dollars of cleanup responsibilities . . . [from] municipalities and impos[ed] their cleanup share on
private parties.”184 Similarly, in describing a major municipal compliance initiative aimed at
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assisting municipalities with meeting CWA treatment requirements, EPA noted that it would
prioritize enforcement actions against “major municipalities”185 and industrial violators.186
The resource constraints facing municipalities continue to drive EPA’s differential
treatment of governmental and corporate regulated entities today. A 2012 CWA compliance
initiative “emphasizes more flexible negotiations with municipalities that lack adequate
resources and whose ratepayers are unable to finance upgrades and repairs to wastewater pipes
and related collection systems.”187 As the Congressional Research Service put it, “[p]ressed by
municipalities about the financial challenges that they face in addressing needs for wastewater
and stormwater control projects,” EPA’s integrated permitting and planning policy seeks to
“provide communities with flexibility to prioritize and sequence needed water infrastructure
investments so that limited public dollars can be invested in ways that each municipality finds
most valuable.”188 Thus, in at least some situations, EPA treats municipalities in enforcementrelated contexts differently from industrial regulated parties, with much more attention paid to
issues such as capacity, affordability, and marginal benefit in the former context. It may be more
reluctant to pursue enforcement action against governmental entities and it may seek less
onerous sanctions when it does.
This analysis is consistent with aspects of Finding 6.189 We found that Next Gen
enforcement settlements were more likely to involve industrial than municipal defendants.190
We also found that the mix of Next Gen tools to which EPA resorted differed for the two
categories of regulated entities. EPA was more likely to impose transparency requirements on
municipalities than industrial sources in enforcement settlements, but was slightly more likely to
require advanced monitoring in settlements against industrial sources. These discrepancies
might be due to any number of factors, including the greater financial commitment that advanced
monitoring may entail as compared to transparency requirements such as posting discharge or
emission levels on a website.
By contending that features of the regulated party that have not been emphasized in
the traditional literature may affect mechanism choice, we are not suggesting that traditional
literatures lack possible explanatory power. Instead, we are convinced that multiple factors,
185

Major municipalities are presumably generally more capable of absorbing noncompliance monetary sanctions
than smaller local government units. But cf. Ralph Blumenthal, Recalling New York at the Brink of Bankruptcy,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/05/nyregion/recalling-new-york-at-the-brink-ofbankruptcy.html (noting that New York City lawyers filed a bankruptcy petition in 1975).
186
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Municipal Policy and Strategy for Construction Grants, NPDES Permits, and
Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act, at 5 (1979), https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0010.pdf ;U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Policy Guidance for FY 1980/1981, at 35 (1979),
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/2000RWOH.PDF?Dockey=2000RWOH.pdf (prioritizing enforcement against
major sources).
187
Cities, Do Your Homework Before Negotiating Sewer Overflows: EPA, 48 ENV’T REP. 1192 (Dec. 1, 2017).
188
Jonathan L. Ramseur, Congressional Research Service, EPA Policies Concerning Integrated Planning and
Affordability of Water Infrastructure, 7-5700, at 3 (2017); see also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Interim Clean Water
Act Settlement Penalty Policy, at 17-20 (Mar. 1, 1995),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/cwapol.pdf (providing guidance on calculating penalties that
was specific to municipal cases).
189
See supra § II B.6.
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See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also Table 7.
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some traditional and some that are part of our expanded array of considerations, may help to
account for mechanism choices. Differential treatment of alleged violators based on a variety
of factors is well-established in the enforcement realm,191 and not all of these are tied to the
type of regulated party involved. For example, the nature and extent of the violations is a
relevant consideration, and both industrial and municipal defendants are capable of
committing serious violations.192 The environmental significance of the violations is another
potential influence that need not be correlated to the nature of the regulated entity.193 The
extent to which a regulated party cooperates with an agency and addresses any violations in a
timely way194 and historic compliance performance are additional relevant considerations.195
Nevertheless, factors such as affordability are likely to influence whether and how the agency
wields its enforcement powers, and it may be possible to generalize about the propensity of
different categories of regulated entities (industrial vs. municipal; large vs. small
businesses196) to be financially capable of meeting particular kinds of regulatory obligations.
Our analysis of the differential treatment of industrial and municipal entities in connection
with Next Gen’s implementation may provide insights into how the identity of regulated
parties (which may involve differences other than this one) influences mechanism choice in
other contexts.
E.

The Possible Influence of the Differences Between Judicial and Administrative
Enforcement

The discussion in this Part so far has focused on the factors that may induce agencies
such as EPA to choose one mechanism (regulations, permits, or adjudicatory enforcement
actions) instead of another. Even if an agency has decided to rely on one of the three
mechanisms, it may have options (what we call intra-mechanism choices) within a mechanism.
The agencies that administer the CWA have the option, for example, of permitting by rule or on
a case-by-case basis, and both EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers have relied heavily on
regulatory (or general) permitting to administer both the National Pollutant Discharge
191

See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2012) (authorizing federal courts to base the amount of civil penalty assessments
on factors that include the defendant’s compliance history and on whether the defendant engaged in good faith
efforts to comply).
192
EPA has long considered the significance of violations in making enforcement decisions. See, e.g., Holistic,
supra note 19, at 65-67; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance,
Memorandum: Revision of NPDES Significant Noncompliance (SNC) Criteria to Address Violations of NonMonthly Average Limits, Sept. 21, 1995, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/memorandum-revision-npdessignificant-noncompliance-snc-criteria-address-violations-non; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF
FY 2016, at 62, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/fy_2016_bib_ combined_v5.pdf
(noting the agency’s intention to allocate resources to noncompliance having the most significant impact).
193
See, e.g., Dynamic Governance, supra note 16, at 593-94; David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf
of Mexico, Environmental Crime, and Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1459 (2011) (“The EPA emphasizes
cases involving significant harm in its policy regarding the exercise of investigative discretion.”).
194
One example is EPA’s self-audit policy. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000). Under this Policy, EPA may waive “gravity-based
penalties for violations that are promptly disclosed and corrected . . . through voluntary audits or compliance
management systems.” Id. at 19,619.
195
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3) (2012).
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Both Congress and federal agencies have long been inclined to treat small businesses preferentially. See
generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small
Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 538 (1998).
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Elimination System and dredge and fill permit programs, respectively.197
In our study, we addressed intra-mechanism choices in a different context – the
pursuit of civil enforcement action through administrative or judicial proceedings.198 EPA
under most of its organic statutes (including the CWA,199 the CAA,200 and RCRA201) has the
option to pursue civil enforcement through either type of proceeding. We sought to determine
the extent to which EPA relied on administrative or judicial proceedings to impose on alleged
violators the obligations relating to Next Gen tools. Finding 7 reflects our findings that nearly
65% of the enforcement settlements during the period we studied that include one or more
Next Gen tool were settlements negotiated jointly with EPA and DOJ to resolve judicial
proceedings. This breakdown differed dramatically from the overall distribution of EPA
settlements during the same period, which tilted overwhelmingly toward administrative
settlements.202
The reasons for this difference are unclear. One possible explanation for the relatively
greater use of judicial settlements in Next Gen cases is that EPA tends to bring more serious
cases judicially.203 Thus, the nature of the violations may be a partial driver of EPA’s intramechanism choice decisions. In addition, cases involving relatively significant violations may
be ripe for Next Gen treatment because innovative approaches (such as advanced monitoring or
innovative enforcement approaches) may have the capacity to mitigate significant concerns that
other, more traditional forms of relief would be less likely to address as effectively.
A third possible explanation is that the government has more leverage to gain regulated
party agreement to innovative injunctive relief in judicial cases because the sanctions are higher
for civil judicial penalty cases than for administrative cases.204 EPA may tend to opt for judicial
enforcement in cases in which it contemplates use of a Next Gen tool because of its perception
that the active participation of DOJ may increase the government’s leverage and the willingness
of enforcement targets to agree to creative approaches to resolve alleged violations.205 Other
factors, such as differences in transaction costs and the prospect for adverse publicity, might also
increase the government’s leverage in judicial cases.
197

See generally Biber & Ruhl, supra note 6.
Criminal charges can only be brought in federal court by DOJ. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2012).
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See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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See Memorandum from Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Enforcement Principles and
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On the other hand, several factors might influence EPA to prefer administrative
enforcement as a mechanism to advance Next Gen tools. These include EPA’s forfeiture to DOJ
of ultimate control over the course of civil judicial enforcement, which does not occur in
administrative proceedings.206 To provide one example, it is not completely clear that EPA and
DOJ were in complete agreement about the use of SEPs as a component of settlement
agreements. DOJ’s concerns about the legality of SEPs, which include commitments to do
things unconnected to the underlying violation, have been dismissed by EPA as “niggling.”207 In
addition, EPA might prefer a more insulated forum in which to experiment with new approaches.
We have offered some tentative explanations here for some of the intra-mechanism
differences we detected. Ultimately, we believe that the value of our findings is to point the way
towards more detailed analysis to understand the reasons for intra-mechanism differences of the
kind we identified. They provide a starting point for identification of the factors and motivations
that may influence intra-mechanism choices such as whether to seek sanctions and other relief in
administrative or judicial proceedings.
F.

The Possible Influence of Supplemental Environmental Projects

As noted above, SEPs are vehicles for imposing on defendants in enforcement actions
requirements that are otherwise not authorized by the statute allegedly violated, typically in
return for a reduction in penalty assessments.208 Finding 8 explored several aspects of EPA’s use
of SEPs. We found that (1) settlements that required the use of one or more Next Gen tool
included SEPs at a much higher rate than all of EPA’s settlements during the period covered by
our study;209 (2) settlements with SEPs included advanced monitoring provisions more often than
settlements without SEPs, but that settlements with SEPs included innovative enforcement
provisions less often than settlements without SEPs;210 (3) a lower percentage of CWA Next Gen
settlements included SEPs than settlements under the CAA or RCRA;211 and (4) EPA used SEPs
more frequently in administrative than in judicial settlements.212 We do not have fully satisfying
explanations for all of these findings. Nevertheless, the tentative reasons we offer in this section
may point the way toward further exploration of the drivers of intra-agency mechanism choices
of the kind involved when EPA decides whether to include a SEP in a settlement.
Given the relative paucity of SEPs in EPA settlements generally, why do SEPs appear in
a higher percentage of Next Gen settlements than for settlements overall? One possibility is that
in at least some cases, EPA’s authority to demand the use of Next Gen tools as relief is not open

See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL §§ 5-12.100, 5-12.111 (2018) (noting that DOJ has responsibility
for civil matters initiated on behalf of the United States for cases brought under the CWA, CAA, RCRA, and several
other environmental statutes).
207
Devins & Herz, supra note 137, at 589; cf. Cruden & Gelber, supra note 137, at 13 (stating that the Attorney
General represents the entire Executive, not simply single agencies, implicitly acknowledging that interests may
differ on that account).
208
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
210
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
211
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See supra note 113 and accompanying text and Table 13.
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and shut.213 Instead, by their nature these tools are innovative. Because SEPs by definition
commit a regulated party to undertake a “beyond compliance” project that might not otherwise
be within the agency’s statutory authority, they may be a particularly attractive vehicle for
resorting to Next Gen tools. This dynamic may help explain why settlements with SEPs
included advanced monitoring provisions more often than settlements without SEPs.
Another question raised by Finding 8 is why the incidence of settlements that included
SEPs differed by statute. An obvious possibility relates to differences in the scope of statutory
authority – EPA may have believed that some of its organic statutes authorize the use of
particular Next Gen tools of the kind included in SEPs while others do not or may not do so. For
example, as we noted above, RCRA requires the use of electronic reporting and the CAA
authorizes the use of advanced monitoring.214 The CWA is silent on both issues. Alternatively,
EPA may have deemed SEPs that include Next Gen tools less necessary or likely to be effective
under some statutes than others because more traditional forms of relief were more likely to
effectively address violations in one environmental medium than another. For example, the
monitoring technology is less well developed for water than air pollution, so the inclusion of a
provision requiring advanced monitoring may have been less attractive to EPA in CWA
settlements.215
Why did SEPs appear in a higher percentage of administrative than judicial settlements?
To some degree, we wonder about the relationship between this aspect of Finding 8 and Finding
7, which found that EPA used judicial (rather than administrative) settlements relatively more
frequently to incorporate Next Gen tools than it did for settlements overall. This latter finding
might make sense if EPA perceived judicial settlements to be a relatively more attractive vehicle
to advance Next Gen goals, but Finding 8 appears to point in the opposite direction, at least with
respect to settlements in which SEPs required the use of Next Gen tools.
These findings may be reconcilable if skepticism about the legality of SEPs on DOJ’s
part discouraged inclusion of SEPs in judicial settlements that are negotiated with the input of
both agencies. If EPA and a regulated party agree that a SEP that includes Next Gen tools is
appropriate, it may make little sense for EPA to risk scuttling the deal by seeking the consent by
DOJ that is necessary for judicial settlements.216 Moreover, if EPA prioritizes the use of Next
Gen tools, the lower penalties that are often assessed in settlements that include SEPs may be
less problematic for EPA than DOJ, which may value the favorable publicity associated with
judicial settlements with high penalty assessments. Thus, factors such as horizontal coordination
challenges and the relative importance of monetary sanctions may have motivated EPA to prefer
administrative to judicial enforcement as a vehicle for pursuing the use of Next Gen tools in
settlements that include SEPs.
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See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing industry opposition to the use of Next Gen tools in
regulation of storage tanks).
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See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., George Wyeth et al., The Impact of Citizen Environmental Science in the United States, 49 ENVTL. L.
REP. __ (forthcoming 2019) (finding that citizen monitoring using advanced technologies is more prevalent for
activities regulated under the CAA than the CWA).
216
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Intra-mechanism nuances such as those associated with Findings 7 and 8 have received
relatively little attention in the literature on agency mechanism choice. Thus, our findings that
there is a relationship between the type of enforcement mechanism EPA used and several other
variables offers a significant new direction for additional research to explore the reasons for the
differences we uncovered.
V.

Conclusion

The nature and scope of an agency’s authority derives from its organic statute or statutes.
These statutes not only provide the substantive mandates and directives which govern agency
pursuit of statutory objectives. They also define the legal mechanisms an agency is authorized to
use to implementat the statute. Three of the most important mechanisms for regulatory agencies
are rulemaking, permitting, and enforcement. An agency cannot develop policy through the
issuance of rules if it lacks delegated rulemaking authority.217 It may only engage in
administrative civil enforcement if its organic statute allows it to do so.218
Frequently, Congress affords discretion to an agency to use more than one legal
mechanism as a means of implementing its organic statute. EPA has such discretion under each
of the three organic statutes (the CWA, the CAA, and RCRA) upon which we have focused in
this Article. In those circumstances, an agency must make choices as to the mechanism or
mechanisms that are most suited to achieving its goals in a particular context.
Until fairly recently, the administrative law literature had relatively little to say about the
inner workings of administrative agencies, tending to focus instead on the relationships between
Congress and agencies and, to an even greater extent, on the relationship between agencies and
the courts called upon to review the validity of their actions. Although the literature on “internal
administrative law” has mushroomed in recent years, one aspect of that component of
administrative law – agency mechanism choice – remains relatively underexplored. The existing
literature on mechanism choice has for the most part focused on the inherent characteristics of
mechanisms such as rulemaking and adjudication to explain what drives agencies to choose one
or another.
That kind of comparison is certainly valuable. We are convinced that the decisionmaking
calculus is considerably more complicated than that, however, and that a host of additional
factors plays a part in agency mechanism choice. We have identified several such factors – the
key actors involved in statutory implementation, the agency’s objectives, the tools or strategies
the agency has devised to accomplish its statutory mandates, and the mandates, discretionary
authority, and constraints imposed by the agency’s organic statute provisions.219
Before the decision in Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 482 F.3d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
the prevailing assumption was that the FTC lacked the authority to issue substantive rules. See GLICKSMAN &
LEVY, supra note 1, at 270.
218
Cf. Nicholas J. Johnson, EPCRA’s Collision with Federalism, 27 IND. L. REV. 549, 566 n.80 (1994) (“The
legislature may delegate enforcement authority to administrative agencies of the executive branch so long as those
delegated powers are controlled by adequate standards.”).
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In this Article, we have tested our hypothesis that these additional factors play a critical
role in agency mechanism choice through an empirical investigation of an initiative by EPA to
enhance its enforcement and compliance assurance programs. As far as we are aware, this is the
first attempt to provide extensive empirical analysis of agency mechanism choice. Our findings
appear to confirm the significance of each of the factors we have identified as potentially
relevant, although in some cases we can only engage in informed speculation about how EPA
weighed these factors in choosing the mechanisms with which it sought to implement different
parts of its Next Gen agenda.
We engaged in this effort not only to help understand the trajectory of Next Gen, but also
to provide a template for further research – empirical and otherwise – into the expanded array of
factors that prompt agency mechanism choices. That research will be valuable not only to
scholars exploring how and why agencies made discretionary mechanism choices, but also to
policymakers in Congress and within the agencies themselves who seek to maximize the
likelihood that agencies will have sufficient means to effectively promote the public interest in
ways consistent with statutory delegations of authority.
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